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ARTICLES
PARTISAN BALANCE REQUIREMENTS IN THE AGE
OF NEW FORMALISM
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr.,* Johnjerica Hodge,** and Wesley W. Wintermyer***
ABSTRACT
This Article considers the constitutional status of mandatory partisan balance requirements
for presidential appointments to independent federal agencies. Since the 1880s, Congress routinely has included partisan balance requirements, along with fixed terms of office and “good
cause” limitations on the President’s removal power, as standard design elements in its template
for independent federal agencies. Until recently, both federal courts and most legal scholars have
assumed the constitutionality of such restrictions on the President’s appointment power—and
with good reason, given the ubiquity of partisan balance requirements and the executive branch’s
historical acquiescence to them. However, the Supreme Court’s decision in Free Enterprise
Fund threatens to upend this well-settled consensus; the decision squarely holds that Congress
may not unduly attenuate the President’s power to supervise and control executive branch entities—including independent agencies—without violating the separation of powers doctrine. In
this Article, we posit that partisan balance requirements, at least when used in conjunction with
fixed terms of office and good cause removal limitations, create a problem of at least equal magnitude to the problem identified in Free Enterprise Fund (namely, unduly insulating executive
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officers with policymaking authority via a two-tiered good cause removal limitation). Under the
logic of Free Enterprise Fund, requiring the President to appoint political opponents to principal offices within the executive branch, and then prohibiting the President from removing such
appointees except for good cause, unduly compromises the President’s ability to supervise and
control these agencies. Although Humphrey’s Executor settled the constitutional status of
good cause limits on the President’s removal power for principal officers serving on independent
federal agencies, Free Enterprise Fund’s broadly formalist reading of the Vesting and Faithful
Execution Clauses strongly suggests that the combination of a partisan balance requirement with
a good cause removal limit constitutes a bridge too far in the age of new formalism.

INTRODUCTION: RECONSIDERING THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS
OF PARTISAN BALANCE REQUIREMENTS
Since the 1880s and the creation of the Utah Commission and the Civil
Service Commission,1 Congress routinely has created federal regulatory entities that feature mandatory bipartisan agency heads. In fact, a partisan balance requirement, in conjunction with a fixed term of office and a “good
cause” limitation on involuntary removal from office, constitutes a core element of the standard design that Congress uses when creating a so-called
“independent” federal agency.2 The entire purpose of these restrictions is to
render the principal officers serving as the heads of such administrative entities less accountable to the President—notwithstanding the fact that these
entities exercise executive power and constitute part of the executive branch
of the federal government.3 The imprimatur of history and practice notwithstanding, the Supreme Court’s decision in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Com-

1 See infra notes 140–72 and accompanying text.
2 See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 483–84
(2010) (discussing constitutive elements of agency independence); see also id. at 586, 588
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (cataloguing federal agencies with significant insulation from direct
forms of presidential control). In addition to fixed terms of office and protection against
removal from office except for good cause, Justice Breyer identifies six additional indicia of
agency independence:
(1) whether the agency consists of a multimember commission; (2) whether its
members are required, by statute, to be bipartisan (or nonpartisan); (3) whether
eligibility to serve as the agency’s head depends on statutorily defined qualifications; (4) whether the agency has independence in submitting budgetary and
other proposals to Congress (thereby bypassing the Office of Management and
Budget); (5) whether the agency has authority to appear in court independent of
the Department of Justice; and (6) whether the agency is explicitly classified as
“independent” by statute.
Id. at 588 (citation omitted); see also Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769 (2013) (cataloguing and discussing various attributes that render a federal administrative agency “independent”).
3 See Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: Party Polarization and
the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REV. 459 (2008).
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pany Accounting Oversight Board4 could force Congress to abandon the use of
mandatory partisan balance requirements for independent federal agencies.5
In 1935, the Supreme Court sustained the use of good cause limitations
on the President’s power to remove a principal executive officer serving on
an independent agency.6 In so doing, it limited the scope of an earlier precedent, Myers v. United States,7 that seemed to hold that the President must
have an unfettered ability to remove executive officers in whom he lacks confidence.8 Humphrey’s Executor and Myers have coexisted, in some tension,
since 1935. The standard account reads Myers to prevent Congress from
aggrandizing itself by claiming a direct share in the President’s removal
power, but concurrently reads Humphrey’s Executor to permit Congress to limit
the President’s removal power provided it does not attempt to reserve some
part of that power for itself. Thus, and notwithstanding sustained scholarly
criticism of Humphrey’s Executor,9 it is a settled aspect of the separation of
4 Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. 477.
5 See infra notes 392–420 and accompanying text. It bears noting that the widespread
and longstanding use of the legislative veto did not save it from constitutional invalidation.
See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954–59 (1983). As Chief Justice Burger explained, “it is
crystal clear from the records of the Convention, contemporaneous writings and debates,
that the Framers ranked other values higher than efficiency.” Id. at 958–59. We do not
question the relevance of historical practice in assessing the constitutional status of a particular structure or practice. See Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss
and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411 (2012). Even so, however, for a formalist,
reliance on a particular practice by Congress and the President—even over a relatively
long period of time—will not save a practice that either misallocates a particular power
from one branch of the federal government to another (aggrandizement) or that deprives
a branch of a power granted it under the Constitution (encroachment). See Chadha, 462
U.S. at 944, 958–59 (noting the many potential benefits associated with the legislative veto
and its consistent use since the New Deal, but nevertheless prohibiting its use on separation of powers grounds); see also Jay S. Bybee, Printz, the Unitary Executive, and the Fire in the
Trash Can: Has Justice Scalia Picked the Court’s Pocket?, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 269, 279–80
(2001) (discussing the concepts of “aggrandizement” and “encroachment” and their use in
separation of powers jurisprudence).
6 Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 627–32 (1935).
7 272 U.S. 52, 116 (1926).
8 Id. at 163–64 (holding that the President must have the power to remove executive
officers in whom he lacks confidence).
9 See Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 41, 93 (“Humphrey’s
Executor, as commentators have noted, is one of the more egregious opinions to be found
on pages of the United States Supreme Court Reports.”). This viewpoint is shared by
others. See, e.g., STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE 3–29
(2008) (positing that, under the Constitution, the President possesses the ability to select
and remove subordinates freely); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994) (arguing that the Constitution and
historical evidence establishes that the President is empowered to administer all federal
laws); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive,
Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1167 & n.62 (1992) (noting the Supreme Court’s
contradictory caselaw on the congressional power to limit presidential control of the executive branch, beginning with Humphrey’s Executor); Saikrishna Prakash, Removal and Tenure

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-3\NDL301.txt

944

unknown

Seq: 4

notre dame law review

2-MAR-15

14:12

[vol. 90:3

powers doctrine that Article II’s Vesting and Faithful Execution Clauses10 do
not require the President to have plenary power to fire any and all principal
and inferior officers working within the executive branch.
To be sure, this standard effort at reconciling Myers and Humphrey’s Executor has left more than a little play in the joints.11 For starters, Humphrey’s
Executor characterizes the office at issue, serving as a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) member, as not constituting service within the executive branch.
Subsequent decisions, such as Morrison v. Olson,12 wisely abandoned this
effort to locate independent agencies in some sort of constitutional Neverland—not a part of Congress, not a part of the executive branch, and not a
part of the judiciary. Today, we understand that independent federal agencies do in fact comprise part of the executive branch;13 even so, however,
in Office, 92 VA. L. REV. 1779, 1782 (2006) (commenting on the incompatible nature of
presidential removal power cases and describing Humphrey’s Executor as “stunted”).
10 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (vesting “[t]he executive power . . . in a President of the
United States of America”); id. art. II, § 3 (charging the President to “take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed”).
11 See Peter L. Strauss, On the Difficulties of Generalization—PCAOB in the Footsteps of
Myers, Humphrey’s Executor, Morrison, and Freytag, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2255, 2259–64
(2011) (discussing the tension between Myers and Humphrey’s Executor).
12 487 U.S. 654, 687–91 (1988). Morrison squarely rejected the suggestion that principal officers within independent federal agencies do not perform executive duties and permitted the extension of a good cause removal limitation to an inferior officer who
performed a “purely executive” function. See id. But cf. Kevin M. Stack, Agency Independence
After PCAOB, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2391, 2392–93 (2011) (suggesting that the presence or
absence of an adjudicative function within an independent federal agency once prefigured
whether the agency could be insulated from direct forms of presidential control and oversight). Professor Stack argues that Free Enterprise Fund appears to reject this dividing line in
favor of a more generalized requirement of presidential oversight power—including
removal power—for any agency vested with significant policymaking authority regardless
of whether it primarily undertakes adjudicative functions. See id. at 2392–93, 2399,
2411–14.
13 Free Enterprise Fund itself goes a long way toward dispelling any illusions to the contrary. See Strauss, supra note 11, at 2275, 2282 (noting that “[a]gain, the question is not
whether [the President] is entitled to command or decide, but what constitute[s] the constitutionally indispensable elements of his necessary oversight relationship” and suggesting
that “[t]he underlying issue . . . is finding a way of accommodating the prolixity of government structures Congress creates without teaching Congress how to avoid the President’s
constitutionally necessary role as our unitary executive”). The decision holds that independent federal agencies constitute “Heads of Departments” for purposes of the Appointments Clause. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477,
510–13 (2010); see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. As Chief Justice Roberts explains, “[a]s
a constitutional matter, we see no reason why a multimember body may not be the
‘Hea[d]’ of a ‘Departmen[t]’ that it governs.” Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 512–13 (alterations in the original). The Appointments Clause vests the appointment of both principal
and inferior executive officers in the President alone, but permits Congress by statute to
provide for the appointment of inferior officers “in the President alone, in the Courts of
Law, or in the Heads of Departments.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Congress may not vest
the appointment of either principal or inferior officers with itself. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 129, 135–43 (1976). Nor may it reserve for itself a power to remove an executive
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good cause removal limitations are not unconstitutional provided that the
President retains a sufficient ability to oversee and direct the operation of a
particular independent agency.14
On the other hand, important questions about attenuating presidential
control over agencies exist and lack concrete answers.15 Most significantly,
the precise boundary dividing Myers and Humphrey’s Executor remains both
ambiguous and disputed. Simply put, we do not know with certainty how far
Congress may go in limiting the President’s ability to direct and supervise the
work of independent federal agencies—or, for that matter, the scope of Congress’s discretion to insulate other executive branch officers from presidential control.16
officer save by impeachment. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 725–27 (1986). If independent federal agencies constitute “Heads of Departments” for purposes of the Appointments Clause, it must mean that these are entities within the executive branch of the
federal government; if this is so, then the Vesting and Faithful Execution Clauses require
some level of presidential oversight and control. See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in
Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 597–601,
640–41 (1984) (arguing that the President must have effective tools at his disposal to check
attempted incursions by Congress into executive branch functions and responsibilities). If
independent federal agencies somehow stood outside of the executive branch, then they
could not appoint inferior officers.
14 Free Enterprise Fund hardly celebrates Humphrey’s Executor but does acknowledge the
continuing precedential value of this decision. See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 483 (citing
Humphrey’s Executor, reciting its holding, and noting that “[t]he parties do not ask us to
reexamine [this precedent], and we do not do so”). So long as Morrison remains good law,
when Congress limits the President’s removal power over an executive officer (whether the
officer holds a principal or an inferior office), the operative analysis involves balancing the
remaining degree and scope of presidential control, the nature of the office (whether it
resides at the core or the periphery of executive branch functions), and the policy objectives that animated Congress’s decision to attenuate presidential control. See Morrison, 487
U.S. at 687–91.
15 As Professor Strauss aptly notes, the Supreme Court’s “decision in Free Enterprise
Foundation [sic] is only the most recent exhibit in this right-minded but inelegantly reasoned chain of opinions.” Strauss, supra note 11, at 2256.
16 For example, could Congress make an inferior office within a cabinet department
subject to a good cause removal limitation? Presumably even functionalists would agree
with the proposition that the Secretary of State or the Attorney General must be subject to
plenary presidential removal power. However, when one enters the realm of subordinate
officers, such as assistant secretaries for particular divisions within the State Department,
the appropriate constitutional analysis becomes considerably murkier. From a formalist
perspective, these questions admit of an easy and obvious answer—any person who exercises policymaking authority within the executive branch must be subject to meaningful
forms of presidential control and oversight. See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 498–502. To
be sure, the formalist analysis, like the functionalist analysis, must consider the residual
scope of presidential authority to apply the governing rule. The difference is that, for the
formalist, the potential benefits of a novel administrative structure are quite irrelevant if
the degree of presidential control has been unduly attenuated; the putative benefits of the
structure are simply irrelevant to the constitutional analysis. For a relevant discussion of
formalist and functionalist reasoning, see Linda D. Jellum, “Which Is to Be Master,” the Judiciary or the Legislature? When Statutory Directives Violate Separation of Powers, 56 UCLA L. REV.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-3\NDL301.txt

946

unknown

Seq: 6

notre dame law review

2-MAR-15

14:12

[vol. 90:3

Until Free Enterprise Fund, a reasonable working assumption would have
been that Congress could set any limits it desired on the President’s ability to
control an independent federal agency provided that Congress did not seek
to claim for itself any supervisory authority over the administrative body.17
After Free Enterprise Fund, however, the world has changed.18 Now, it has
become necessary to inquire not only into whether Congress has aggrandized
itself by claiming supervisory authority over a federal regulatory entity, but
also to inquire into whether a particular limitation—or combination of limits—on the President’s supervisory powers unduly attenuates presidential
control and accountability.19
In this Article, we consider whether Free Enterprise Fund raises constitutional problems for mandatory partisan balance requirements applicable to
the President’s appointment of principal and inferior federal executive
officers. Congress has not infrequently required the President to name members of the opposition party to principal offices within the executive
branch;20 partisan balance requirements have the purpose and effect of rendering executive agencies less responsive to the President by requiring the
President to staff such entities with no more than a majority of her own politi837, 854–55, 860–62, 870–78 (2009) (providing a comprehensive and thoughtful overview
of formalism and functionalism, with citations to major works in the field); see also M.
Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127,
1136–47 (2000) (describing and critiquing the use of “formalism” and “functionalism” as
discrete categories for separation of powers analysis and suggesting that the dichotomy
oversimplifies the issues at stake); John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1939, 1950–62 (2011) (discussing and describing formalism and
functionalism but suggesting that a more textual approach to deciding separation of powers questions might provide a better method of analysis).
17 See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 689–91, 695–96 (holding that, in light of the significant
political benefits and enhanced credibility that insulation from political control conveyed
on an independent counsel, Congress could constitutionally insulate from presidential
removal an independent counsel charged with principal and direct responsibility for criminal law enforcement); see also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., On the Danger of Wearing Two Hats:
Mistretta and Morrison Revisited, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 417, 440–47 (1998) (discussing
and critiquing the majority opinion in Morrison).
18 See Stack, supra note 12, at 2392 (arguing that “the logic of PCAOB’s separation-ofagency-functions principle has no necessary limitation to second-tier removal protections”
and suggesting that “[t]aken to its full extension, it redraws the constitutional grounding
of agency independence”); id. at 2419 (arguing that “[a]t a minimum, within independent
agencies, [Free Enterprise Fund] preserves the second layer of removal protection only for
dedicated adjudicators” but noting also that “its logic extends further”).
19 See Aziz Z. Huq, Removal as a Political Question, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2–6, 17–19, 35–36
(2013) (arguing that a broad reading of Free Enterprise Fund would have very significant
implications for Congress’s ability to create and maintain independent federal agencies
and would call into constitutional question more than multilevel good cause removal protections); see also Kent H. Barnett, Avoiding Independent Agency Armageddon, 87 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1349, 1350–52, 1360–63 (2012) (arguing that Free Enterprise Fund could fundamentally change separation of powers analysis for independent federal agencies unless its holding can be limited and renormalized).
20 See infra notes 175–83 and accompanying text.
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cal supporters. If Congress may not constitutionally limit the President’s
oversight powers by unduly restricting her removal power, it seems quite reasonable to ask whether it is permissible to limit the President’s appointment
power at the front end of things.
Judge Janice Rogers Brown of the United States Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit has forcefully argued for a broad reading of Free Enterprise Fund
and suggested that design elements that are constitutional in isolation might
be unconstitutional when combined.21 As she states the proposition, “just
because two structural features raise no constitutional concerns independently does not mean Congress may combine them in a single statute.”22 We
believe that, at least under a broad reading of Free Enterprise Fund, this premise could well be correct. And, as Professor Huq aptly has noted, “[t]he
Free Enterprise Fund principle cannot easily be limited to ‘dual for-cause’
regimes”23 and could easily be read broadly to disallow other, even more
commonplace structural design elements for independent agencies.24
Along similar lines, Professor Peter L. Strauss, a leading scholar of
administrative law, has suggested that Free Enterprise Fund could have “enormous” implications for the ability of Congress to insulate federal executive
agencies from direct forms of presidential oversight and control.25 Professor
Kevin M. Stack, also a leading administrative law scholar, posits that after Free
Enterprise Fund, “[s]eparation of powers has a new endeavor”26 and that the
decision “has the potential to restructure the constitutional footing for agencies with a single level of good-cause removal protection, preserving that protection for dedicated adjudicators but casting it aside for agencies with more
than just adjudicative functions.”27 And, yet another administrative law
scholar, Professor Kent H. Barnett, has characterized Free Enterprise Fund as
portending “independent agency armageddon.”28
In this Article, we do not claim that Free Enterprise Fund necessarily or
inevitably portends “independent agency armageddon” or anything even
approaching it (if by “armageddon” one means the end of such entities as we
have come to know them since the 1880s). Our claims and ambitions are
more modest; the seven seals may well remain intact and the four horsemen
unsaddled. The Supreme Court often makes broad pronouncements,
21 See Ass’n of Am. R.R. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 721 F.3d 666, 672–73 (D.C. Cir.
2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 2865 (2014).
22 Id. at 673.
23 Huq, supra note 19, at 3.
24 Id. at 2–6, 17–20.
25 Strauss, supra note 11, at 2261.
26 Stack, supra note 12, at 2419.
27 Id.
28 See Barnett, supra note 19, at 1349; see also Harold J. Krent, Federal Power, Non-Federal
Actors: The Ramifications of Free Enterprise Fund, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2425, 2427 (2011)
(suggesting that Free Enterprise Fund raises serious questions about novel administrative
structures and, in particular, “provides renewed reason to consider whether congressional
delegations outside the federal government” are consistent with the separation of powers
doctrine).
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thought to indicate a revolution in an important area of the law, such as the
separation of powers or federalism, and yet, in the end, little (or nothing)
ever really comes of the decision.29 If read and applied narrowly, the decision could mean only that Congress cannot insulate principal or inferior
executive officers from removal through a multilayered system of good cause
removal protections—and nothing more. As one of us previously has noted,
“[t]he Supreme Court is not required to follow the implications of its decisions to their logical conclusions.”30
On the other hand, Free Enterprise Fund and the new formalism that the
decision reflects could mean a stronger, more demanding emphasis on
ensuring that the President enjoys meaningful oversight and control powers
over independent federal agencies. If Free Enterprise Fund proves to be a
major landmark decision, as Judges Janice Rogers Brown and Brett Kavanaugh separately have argued,31 the constitutional status of partisan balance
requirements will need to be reassessed under the more demanding, formalist separation of powers metrics that Free Enterprise Fund has established.
The argument proceeds in four parts. We begin in Part I by considering
Free Enterprise Fund and the “new formalism” in separation of powers analysis
that it represents.32 In Part II, we examine the origins and history of partisan
balance requirements for independent federal agencies.33 This structural
innovation dates to the 1880s and has been, for the most part, uncontroversial and widely accepted by Congress, the President, and the federal courts.
In fact, several Presidents actually have invited Congress to create federal
administrative entities that feature mandatory bipartisanship in their leadership.34 In Part III, we analyze and critique the potential practical implica29 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). Printz, broadly read, would
have spelled the end of many cooperative federalism programs that vest state executive
officers with the enforcement of federal law. See Evan H. Caminker, Printz, State Sovereignty, and the Limits of Formalism, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 199, 230–32 (noting the very broad
implications of Printz for a variety of cooperative federalism programs); Roderick M. Hills,
Jr., Federalism in Constitutional Context, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 181, 183–85 (1998) (noting that the Supreme Court did not fully explore the potential implications of its decision
in Printz and that the majority’s opinion has not been broadly interpreted and applied
going forward). But cf. Bybee, supra note 5, at 288 (arguing that “[w]e have not seen the
last of Section III.B of Justice Scalia’s opinion in Printz” and predicting that “Justice Scalia
will be back with Printz”). However, the Supreme Court, at least to date, has declined to
follow the logic of Printz to its logical conclusions. So too, whether Free Enterprise Fund
constitutes armageddon for independent federal agencies or merely a bump in the road
remains to be seen.
30 Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Cooperative Federalism, the New Formalism, and the Separation
of Powers Revisited: Free Enterprise Fund and the Problem of Presidential Oversight of State-Government Officers Enforcing Federal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 1599, 1668 (2012).
31 Ass’n of Am. R.R. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 721 F.3d 666, 672–74 (D.C. Cir. 2013),
cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 2865 (2014); In re Aiken Cnty., 645 F.3d 428, 439–46 (D.C. Cir.
2011) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
32 See infra Part I.
33 See infra Part II.
34 See infra notes 175–81 and accompanying text.
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tions of mandatory partisan balance requirements on the political dynamics
and functioning of independent federal agencies.35 To be clear, from a formalist perspective, real-world adverse effects on the President’s ability to oversee and direct an administrative agency need not be proven to establish the
existence of a separation of powers violation; formalists view prophylactic
efforts to police the separation of powers as necessary to avoid the evils of
undue concentrations of government power (whether or not such concentrations would likely come into existence in the absence of such prophylactic
efforts).36
Part IV considers whether, in light of historical practice, the effects of
partisan balance requirements on the functioning of federal independent
agencies, and the imperatives of the unitary executive (as defined and explicated by the Free Enterprise Fund majority), the use of partisan balance
requirements, whether in isolation or in conjunction with fixed terms of
office and good cause removal protections, would likely survive judicial
review in the age of new formalism.37 To cut to the chase, we believe that the
addition of each additional factor—partisan balance requirements, a fixed
term of years appointment, and good cause removal protection—incre35 See infra Part III.
36 See Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, “If Angels Were to Govern”: The Need for
Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 450–51 (1991) (observing that formalist separation of powers theory and practice, from the time of the Framers
to the present, seeks to prevent undue concentrations of government power that could be
potentially conducive to “tyranny” and does so regardless of whether or not bad outcomes
would actually occur in the absence of such strictures); see also Manning, supra note 16, at
1950, 1958 (noting that “[f]ormalist theory presupposes that the constitutional separation
of powers establishes readily ascertainable and enforceable rules of separation” whereas
“[f]unctionalists believe that the Constitution’s structural clauses ultimately supply few useful details of meaning”). But cf. Huq, supra note 19, at 6 (questioning whether formalist
separation of powers theory and practice actually enhance presidential oversight over independent agencies and political accountability and arguing that “[t]aken together, these
critiques undermine the putative correlation between presidential removal authority and
democratic accountability”). Professor Huq asks and answers a question that would not
necessarily occur to a formalist (like Chief Justice Roberts)—namely, whether the absence
of judicial enforcement of separation of powers principles would cause actual harm to the
President’s ability to supervise and control the executive branch. As Justice William J.
Brennan, Jr., pointed out, in many instances, enforcement of the separation of powers will
seem unnecessary—and perhaps even paranoid—particularly in light of the obvious potential benefits of permitting novel new administrative structures. See Commodity Futures
Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 863 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (objecting
that “the Court pits an interest the benefits of which are immediate, concrete, and easily
understood against one, the benefits of which are almost entirely prophylactic, and thus
often seem remote and not worth the cost in any single case”). Justice Brennan feared that
in most cases, ad hoc balancing would inevitably cut against judicial enforcement of the
separation of powers; yet, the whole point of the separation of powers doctrine is to prevent problems that might arise in the absence of these principles—not problems that have
already arisen. See id. at 863 (“Article III’s prophylactic protections were intended to prevent just this sort of abdication to claims of legislative convenience.”).
37 See infra Part IV.
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mentally adds weight in favor of finding that a separation of powers violation
exists.38 Thus, a federal independent agency that features all three design
elements should be deemed more objectionable than an agency whose
design features only one or two of these elements. Finally, the Article closes
with a brief summary and conclusion.39
In the end, we believe that the conjunction of partisan balance requirements with good cause removal protection probably renders the President’s
ability to oversee an independent agency too attenuated to survive judicial
review post–Free Enterprise Fund.40 We also will cheerfully stipulate that this
conclusion would not command universal support on the current Supreme
Court.41 Even so, if Free Enterprise Fund does in fact signal an enhanced commitment to the unitary executive theory of presidential power by a durable
working majority of the Supreme Court, the constitutional status of partisan
balance requirements—particularly when linked with good cause removal
limitations—is open to considerable doubt.
I. FREE ENTERPRISE FUND

AND THE

RISE

OF THE

NEW FORMALISM

This Part proceeds in three stages. First, we consider the holding and
potential meaning of Free Enterprise Fund. Second, we explore functionalism
and formalism as framing devices for defining and enforcing the separation
of powers doctrine. Third, and finally, we consider relevant commentary by
administrative law scholars regarding the potential impact of Free Enterprise
Fund on Congress’s ability to create novel administrative structures that insulate federal agencies from presidential oversight and control.
A.

A Brief Overview of Free Enterprise Fund and the Supreme Court’s
Separation of Powers Jurisprudence

For many years, the Supreme Court has vacillated between strictly
enforcing the separation of powers (a posture of formalism) and taking a
more flexible, cost/benefit approach (a posture of functionalism).42 Myers
and Humphrey’s Executor reflect this duality: Myers is a strongly formalist decision, whereas Humphrey’s Executor adopts a functionalist analysis.43 Despite
this historic inability to choose definitively one approach or the other, the
Roberts Court consistently has issued strongly formalist separation of powers
38 See infra Part IV.
39 See infra Conclusion.
40 See infra Sections III.A–B.
41 See Strauss, supra note 11, at 2275–76 (discussing Justice Breyer’s “strident” dissenting opinion for “the (relatively) liberal wing of the Court”). At least four Justices (Associate Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Kagan, and Sotomayor) do not embrace either the new
formalism or formalist analysis of separation of powers questions with the same brio as
Chief Justice Roberts and Associate Justices Alito, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas.
42 See infra notes 44–109 and accompanying text.
43 See supra notes 6–16 and accompanying text.
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decisions. Moreover, this embrace of the new formalism represents a sharp
break with the approach of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts.
In the 1980s and 1990s, the Supreme Court was often, although not
always, willing to engage in a functionalist analysis of novel administrative
structures.44 As Professor Marty Redish and his coauthor, Elizabeth Cisar,
aptly note, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts “evinced something of a split
personality, seemingly wavering from resort to judicial enforcement with a
formalistic vengeance to use of a so-called ‘functional’ approach that
appear[ed] to be designed to do little more than rationalize incursions by
one branch of the federal government into the domain of another.”45
Consistent with a “wavering” approach to strict enforcement of the separation of powers, the Supreme Court overwhelmingly sustained the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act46 and also easily
sustained the structure and functions of the U.S. Sentencing Commission
against multiple separation of powers objections.47 At the same time, however, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts strictly enforced the separation of
powers in other cases.48 Most notably, the Supreme Court invalidated the
legislative veto as transgressing the separation of powers by permitting enactment of a law without either bicameral passage of a bill or presentment of a
bill previously passed by both houses of Congress to the President.49 The
Supreme Court also disallowed, repeatedly, efforts by Congress to aggrandize
itself either by directly naming members of independent agencies or by vest44 See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851–52
(1986) (applying a very flexible functionalist analysis to ascertain whether Congress could
vest the adjudication of certain common law counterclaims in an independent federal
agency).
45 Redish & Cisar, supra note 36, at 450 (footnote omitted).
46 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 695–96 (1988).
47 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 399, 406–07 (1989).
48 Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 732–34 (1986); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944–59
(1983).
49 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944, 954–56, 958. Some years later, in 1998, using similarly
formalist reasoning, the Supreme Court invalidated the Line Item Veto Act, which purported to vest the President with the power to cancel certain appropriations and tax
expenditures. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998). Writing for the majority, Justice John Paul Stevens explained that “[t]here is no provision in the Constitution
that authorizes the President to enact, to amend, or to repeal statutes,” and, accordingly,
Congress could not constitutionally confer such a power on the President by statute. Id. at
438. He added that “[i]n both legal and practical effect, the President has amended two
Acts of Congress by repealing a portion of each.” Id. To vest the President with the power
to cancel portions of duly enacted statutes via a line item veto power, a constitutional
amendment would be requisite. See id. at 449 (“If there is to be a new procedure in which
the President will play a different role in determining the final text of what may ‘become a
law,’ such change must come not by legislation but through the amendment procedures
set forth in Article V of the Constitution.”). Clinton v. City of New York constitutes a broad
reaffirmation, application, and extension of the Chadha rule that “repeal of statutes, no less
than enactment, must conform with Art. I.” Chadha, 462 U.S. at 954; see Clinton, 524 U.S. at
438 (quoting and applying Chadha on this exact point).
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ing the execution of federal laws in legislative officers.50 Thus, the story is
complicated and in the late twentieth century the Supreme Court was not
consistently committed to embracing either a functionalist or a formalist
approach when deciding separation of powers questions.
The Roberts Court, however, has shown a remarkable consistency in its
approach to analyzing separation of powers questions. In every major case,
the Roberts Court has used a formalist analysis and rejected efforts to blend
executive, legislative, and judicial functions.51 Meanwhile, functionalism and
functionalist analysis has been relegated to dissents. Free Enterprise Fund provides an excellent example of this trend.
Free Enterprise Fund involved a challenge to the terms under which members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), an
administrative entity created under the auspices of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002,52 were to hold office. Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) appoints the members of the PCAOB and
enjoys some oversight authority over the PCAOB’s work—“particularly with
respect to the issuance of rules or the imposition of sanctions (both of which
are subject to Commission approval and alteration).”53 Significantly, however, the SEC lacks any general authority to remove members of the PCAOB;
the PCAOB’s members “are substantially insulated from the Commission’s
control”54 and under the terms of the organic act may be removed from
office only “ ‘for good cause shown’ ” and “ ‘in accordance with’ certain procedures.”55 In turn, the Free Enterprise Fund majority also found that the SEC’s
commissioners could only be removed by the President for good cause.56
50 Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 726–27, 732–34; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 135–43 (1976).
51 See Krotoszynski, supra note 30, at 1606–07, 1615–23 (citing and discussing the relevant cases). As one of us previously has observed, “[t]he Roberts Court’s separation-ofpowers decisions, however, reflect a strong, pronounced, and consistent turn toward formalism.” Id. at 1602.
52 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002); see 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211–7215 (2012) (creating the PCAOB and vesting it with the power to write and enforce rules governing accounting firms that provide services to publicly traded corporations).
53 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 486 (2010).
54 Id.
55 Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(6)).
56 See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 487 (“The parties agree that the Commissioners
cannot themselves be removed by the President except under the Humphrey’s Executor standard of ‘inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office,’ . . . and we decide the case
with that understanding.” (citations omitted)); see also 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5) (including the
SEC among a list of “independent regulatory agenc[ies]”). Several scholarly commentators have been particularly critical of this aspect of the majority opinion. See, e.g., Huq,
supra note 19, at 15 (characterizing the majority’s assumption that the SEC commissioners
enjoy good cause protection from presidential removal as an “unorthodox stipulation of
law” that permitted “the Court to frame the question presented as focused on the constitutionality of ‘dual for-cause limitations’ on presidential control”); Strauss, supra note 11, at
2276 (charactering the majority’s acceptance of the joint stipulation as “quite astonishing,
particularly coming from conservative Justices who repeatedly assert that it is for Congress,
not the courts, to make law”).
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The constitutional question presented was whether a two-tiered system of
good cause removal protection violated the separation of powers by unduly
attenuating the President’s ability to oversee the PCAOB’s policymaking
activities—as arguably required by Article II’s Vesting and Faithful Execution
Clauses.57
Writing for a five-to-four majority, Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr.
found that this system of multilevel good cause removal protection violated
the separation of powers doctrine: “We hold that such multilevel protection
from removal is contrary to Article II’s vesting of the executive power in the
President.”58 Moreover, he added that “[t]he President cannot ‘take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed’ if he cannot oversee the faithfulness of
the officers who execute them.”59 Thus, the PCAOB’s structure “contravene[d] the President’s ‘constitutional obligation to ensure the faithful execution of the laws.’ ”60
The Free Enterprise Fund majority’s most fundamental objection was that
the two-tiered system of good cause removal protection unduly insulated the
PCAOB from presidential control and oversight, given the fact that the
PCAOB’s duties included significant policymaking authority. Chief Justice
Roberts explained that “[n]either the President, nor anyone directly responsible to him, nor even an officer whose conduct he may review only for good
cause, has full control over the Board.”61 This arrangement was constitutionally problematic because “[w]ithout the ability to oversee the Board, or to
attribute the Board’s failings to those whom he can oversee, the President is
no longer the judge of the Board’s conduct.”62 In turn, “[h]e can neither
ensure that the laws are faithfully executed, nor be held responsible for a
Board member’s breach of faith.”63 In sum, the President cannot be held
accountable for the actions of an entity so far removed from his supervisory
powers, but the Constitution requires that the President be accountable for
the execution of the laws.64
The majority rejected functionalist objections to its holding, quoting
Bowsher and Chadha on the point that “[c]onvenience and efficiency are not
the primary objectives—or the hallmarks—of democratic government.”65
57 See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 483–84 (“May the President by restricted in his ability
to remove a principal officer, who is in turn restricted in his ability to remove an inferior
officer, even though that inferior officer determines the policy and enforces the laws of the
United States?”).
58 Id. at 484.
59 Id.
60 Id. (quoting Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693 (1988)).
61 Id. at 496.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 See id. at 498 (“By granting the Board executive power without the Executive’s oversight, this Act subverts the President’s ability to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed—as well as the public’s ability to pass judgment on his efforts.”).
65 Id. at 499 (citations omitted) (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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The majority was also quite indifferent to whether the enhanced potential for
presidential control afforded by invalidating the PCAOB’s good cause
removal protection actually affected the day-to-day operation of the PCAOB.
Even if Presidents agreed to such multilevel good cause protection or, as
a practical matter, abdicated their oversight responsibilities, the separation of
powers requires at least the possibility of active presidential oversight and control.66 The formal legal structure that governs presidential oversight of federal agencies must comply with the imperatives of a unitary executive (as
specified in Article II). Accordingly, “[i]n its pursuit of a ‘workable government,’ Congress cannot reduce the Chief Magistrate to a cajoler-in-chief.”67
In sum, Congress cannot legally estrange executive officers from the
President. As Chief Justice Roberts explains, “[t]he Constitution that makes
the President accountable to the people for executing the laws also gives him
the power to do so.”68 Some meaningful power of removal, at most attenuated by a single layer of good cause removal protection, must remain with the
President or a person directly accountable to the President. For “[w]ithout
such power, the President could not be held fully accountable for discharging his own responsibilities; the buck would stop somewhere else.”69
Justice Stephen Breyer authored a strong dissenting opinion that,
employing a functionalist lens, found no valid constitutional objection to a
two-tiered system of good cause removal protection (at least for an entity
vested with the PCAOB’s portfolio).70 He argued that the use of two-tiered
good cause removal protection should be considered in light of its costs and
benefits: “When previously deciding this kind of nontextual question, the
Court has emphasized the importance of examining how a particular provision, taken in context, is likely to function.”71 He explained that “a functional approach permits Congress and the President the flexibility needed to
adapt statutory law to changing circumstances.”72 Justice Breyer warned
against the adoption of “bright-line rules”73 and in favor of considering
“function and context.”74
Justice Breyer opined that a strict formalism cannot be squared with the
growth in the size, importance, and complexity of the modern administrative
state. He emphasized that “[t]he functional approach required by our precedents recognizes this administrative complexity and, more importantly, recognizes the various ways presidential power operates within this context—
and the various ways in which a removal provision might affect that power.”75
66 See id. at 498–500.
67 Id. at 502.
68 Id. at 513.
69 Id. at 514.
70 See id. at 514–49 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
71 Id. at 519; see id. at 523 (“Thus, here, as in similar cases, we should decide the
constitutional question in light of the provision’s practical functioning in context.”).
72 Id. at 520.
73 Id. at 519–20.
74 Id. at 519.
75 Id. at 522.
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Applying the functionalist, context-specific, cost/benefit analysis that he
believed requisite, Justice Breyer found that the two-tiered good cause
removal structure easily passed constitutional muster. Breyer posited that
“[w]here a ‘for cause’ provision is so unlikely to restrict presidential power
and so likely to further a legitimate institutional need, precedent strongly
supports its constitutionality.”76 Because “the Court’s prior cases impose
functional criteria that are readily met here,” the multilevel for cause protection did not transgress the separation of powers doctrine.77 For Justice
Breyer and the other three dissenting Justices (Justices Stevens, Ginsburg,
and Sotomayor), the pursuit of a “workable Government that the Constitution seeks to create”78 more than justifies a system that substantially insulates
executive officers tasked primarily with adjudicative functions from direct
forms of presidential control and oversight.
In sum, the majority and dissenting opinions in Free Enterprise Fund really
do constitute two ships passing in the night—they employ radically different
lenses for analysis of separation of powers questions. Chief Justice Roberts
adopts a categorical approach that seeks to classify the nature of the institution and the power that it exercises—once one concludes that the SEC and
PCAOB fall within the executive branch and exercise significant policymaking authority, the case is all but over; any and all such executive entities must
be directly accountable to the President. From this perspective, Humphrey’s
Executor and Morrison represent the outer limits of permissible insulation of
executive officers from presidential control.
For Justice Breyer, the constitutional imperatives of Congress’s general
legislative authority,79 in conjunction with the Necessary and Proper
Clause,80 give Congress no less sound a constitutional claim than the President with respect to how an agency should be structured. Moreover, in his
view, formalism for its own sake has relatively little to recommend it—particularly when formalism will not even ensure in practice that the President’s de
facto (as opposed to de jure) oversight powers are enhanced. The dissent is
a classic exposition of functionalist values and methodology. And, from a
functional perspective, sufficient reasons exist to justify whatever minimal
incursion the two-tiered good cause removal regime makes on the unitary
executive.

76 Id. at 532.
77 Id. at 535–36.
78 Id. at 549.
79 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of
Representatives.”).
80 See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (providing that Congress shall have power “[t]o make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States or in any Department or Officer thereof”).
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Free Enterprise Fund and the New Formalism

Before proceeding to the doctrinal and jurisprudential impact of Free
Enterprise Fund, a brief overview of “formalism” and “functionalism” as
organizing concepts for separation of powers analysis is necessary. We
should concede at the outset that some prominent public law scholars,
including Professors Bruce Ackerman81 and Edward Rubin,82 have questioned the utility of formalism and functionalism as coherent framing devices
for generalized approaches to defining and enforcing the separation of powers doctrine. So have leading administrative law scholars, such as Dean Elizabeth Magill83 and Professor John Manning.84 To be sure, these sustained
critiques possess merit.
First, both approaches seem to borrow insights and perspectives that
appear to be more consonant with the other baseline approach.85 Formalists
will sometimes make pragmatic policy arguments that appear to have little
direct relationship to the Constitution’s text. For example, Free Enterprise
Fund places great emphasis on the importance of democratic accountability—but it is not entirely clear how or why a higher degree of presidential
control over the PCAOB necessarily advances this value or how this value can
be inferred from the text of Article II.86 Similarly, many functionalists will
concede the imperative of making federal administrative agencies accountable to the President.87 Even if no fixed rule exists regarding the necessary
relationship between the President and independent federal agencies, some
level of presidential oversight is requisite because presidential control is a
necessary counterweight to congressional influence.88
Legal scholars who question the internal coherence of formalism and
functionalism also object that the formalism/functionalism dichotomy
81 Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 634–36 (2000)
(opposing “the export of the American system [of separation of powers]” to other countries and advocating instead reliance on the parliamentary model used in many democratic
polities, and particularly the German constitutional framework under the Basic Law).
82 EDWARD L. RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT 12 (2005) (advocating the retirement of commonly used, but nevertheless outdated, organizing concepts when analyzing governmental
structures and their functions and proposing instead approaching the administrative state
with an updated, contemporary conceptual framework).
83 Magill, supra note 16, at 1132–38, 1148–49.
84 Manning, supra note 16, at 1950–62.
85 Magill, supra note 16, at 1136–47 (describing and critiquing the common ground
between formalism and functionalism and describing that common ground as incoherent
and inadequate).
86 See Huq, supra note 19, at 5–6, 17–19, 35–36.
87 See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 13, at 640–41 (arguing for the practical necessity of
presidential control and oversight over federal administrative agencies and also observing
that “[c]entral to the overall judgments of the Constitution, and reflected in these textual
passages, is the elementary judgment that we were to have a unitary, politically responsible
head of government, possessed of sufficient independent authority to serve as an enduring
counterweight to the political muscle of Congress”).
88 See id. at 641–42, 648–50.
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grossly oversimplifies the relevant relationships between the President, Congress, and administrative agencies.89 As Professor Manning puts the case,
“[n]ew thinking about the legitimacy of strongly purposive reasoning reveals
difficulties with the approach that underlies both strands of modern separation of powers doctrine.”90 Simply put, in order to make these broad categories work as general organizing principles, one has to ignore a great many
potentially relevant considerations.91 Rather than adopting a holistic framing device that fails to account for all relevant considerations, these critics
advocate more contextual analysis on a case-by-case basis.92 One size—or
even two sizes—will not fit all facts and circumstances.93
Although we generally agree that the formalism/functionalism dichotomy provides an imperfect mode of analysis,94 we nevertheless believe that it
represents a useful organizing metric. Moreover, the contemporary Supreme
Court has embraced this nomenclature and has done so repeatedly.
Whether or not this decision represents the best possible choice, the choice
has been made. Accordingly, this Article will rely on formalism and functionalism as potentially useful analytical tools. But, precisely what are formalism
and functionalism? And what are the salient characteristics of both
approaches?
Formalism generally seeks to enforce strictly the separation of powers set
forth in the text of the Constitution. It places significant reliance on the
separate Vesting Clauses of Articles I, II, and III.95 Creative reassignment of
these powers among and between the three branches cannot be constitutionally countenanced because the Framers vested the legislative, executive, and
judicial powers in separate branches of the federal government.96
89 See Manning, supra note 16, at 1950–62; see also Magill, supra note 16, at 854–55,
870–78.
90 Manning, supra note 16, at 1972.
91 See Magill, supra note 16, at 1132–38, 1148–49 (“[N]either of the dominant
approaches [formalism and functionalism] provides a consistent account of the methodology applied or the outcome of the cases.”); Manning, supra note 16, at 1971–72 (questioning the utility of the formalism/functionalism dichotomy and proposing instead an
approach derived more directly from the Constitution’s text).
92 See Manning, supra note 16, at 1950–62.
93 See Jellum, supra note 16, at 878–79 (“Rigidly dividing separation of powers analysis
into these two categories, formalism and functionalism, is imperfect.”).
94 M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers Law, 150 U.
PA. L. REV. 603, 609 (2001).
95 Redish & Cisar, supra note 36, at 455 n.24; see Jellum, supra note 16, at 861 (“Formalism is, thus, a textually literal approach that relies primarily on the vesting clauses to
define categories of power—legislative, executive, and judicial—and to identify the owner
of each power.”).
96 Krotoszynski, supra note 17, at 418 n.4 (“Formalism emphasizes the structural separation of powers reflected in the division of legislative, executive, and judicial power in
Articles I, II, and III of the Constitution.”); Redish & Cisar, supra note 36, at 449–56 (discussing the practical and theoretical motivations that undergird the formalist approach to
the separation of powers doctrine). For general discussions of formalism and functionalism, see Harold J. Krent, Separating the Strands in Separation of Powers Controversies, 74 VA. L.
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As Dean Magill explains, formalism “emphasizes that the Constitution
divides governmental power into three categories and, with some explicit textual exceptions, assigns those powers to three different branches of government.”97 What’s more, formalism does not concern itself very much with the
real-world effects—or lack of effects—associated with this strict separation of
each branch of the federal government. As Professor Lee Liberman notes,
formalists “assume[ ] that all exercises of power must fall into one of these
categories and take[ ] no ostensible account of the practicalities of administration in arriving at this determination.”98 She adds that “[a] formalist decision uses a syllogistic, definitional approach to determining whether a
particular exercise of power is legislative, executive, or judicial.”99
By way of contrast, “[f]unctionalism focuses on the substantive policy
goals that a particular assignment of responsibilities seeks to achieve or
advance and provides that as long as a given scheme does not reassign one of
the core functions of a coordinate branch, the arrangement should be permitted.”100 From a functionalist perspective, attenuating the President’s
power to oversee the operation of an independent federal agency does not
constitute a per se violation of the separation of powers;101 in order to ascertain the constitutional permissibility of an independent federal agency’s
structure, one would have to take into account the nature of the agency, the
precise scope of its powers, the direct and indirect means available to the
President to direct its operations, and so forth.102
The Roberts Court, unlike the Burger and Rehnquist Courts,103 has not
demonstrated any ambivalence whatsoever about the proper attitude toward
congressional efforts to redistribute or limit the exercise of powers assigned
by the Constitution to a particular branch of the federal government—formalism is enjoying a period of broad ascendency.104 The Roberts Court has
eschewed functionalist analysis and reasoning in all of its major separation of
REV. 1253, 1254–55 (1988) (describing the formalism/functionalism debate generally),
and Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions—A
Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 492–96 (1987) (discussing formalism and
functionalism and making a sustained general argument in favor of functionalism).
97 Magill, supra note 94, at 608.
98 Lee S. Liberman, Morrison v. Olson: A Formalistic Perspective on Why the Court Was
Wrong, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 313, 343 (1989).
99 Id.
100 Krotoszynski, supra note 17, at 417 n.4; see Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the
New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 495–96 (1987).
101 See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 524–30,
548–49 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
102 See id.
103 Krotoszynski, supra note 30, at 1606–07.
104 But cf. CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 5 (1990) (failing to anticipate the Roberts Court’s strong embrace of formalism in separation of powers analysis and
positing that “[i]t is too late in the day to protest the interment of separation of powers
formalism, at least in the context of multifunction administrative agencies”). Given the
fervently functionalist tenor of the Supreme Court’s major separation of powers decisions
in the late 1980s—notably including Mistretta and Morrison—Dean Edley’s premature con-
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powers decisions.105 Repeatedly, reliably, and forcefully, the Roberts Court
has embraced highly formalist reasoning and outcomes.106
This new commitment to formalism potentially raises new and interesting questions about the constitutional status of independent federal agencies. Prior to Free Enterprise Fund, most judges, lawyers, and legal scholars
would have rejected out of hand the notion that Congress could not deploy
good cause protections against removal in designing both agencies and
subunits that would operate within particular agencies.107 And yet, the Free
Enterprise Fund Court held that a two-tiered system of good cause removal
unduly attenuated presidential control and oversight, giving rise to a constitutional problem that could be resolved only by holding the second layer of
signment of formalism to the dust heap of administrative law jurisprudence should be
entirely understandable.
105 See, e.g., Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2608–09 (2011); Free Enterprise Fund, 561
U.S. at 495–502; New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674, 679–81 (2010); see also
Krotoszynski, supra note 30, at 1605–08 (discussing the consistent formalist approach
reflected in Roberts Court decisions). In its most recent term, a unanimous Supreme
Court employed formalist reasoning to restrict significantly the President’s ability to make
recess appointments to fill executive and judicial positions without obtaining the Senate’s
advice and consent. See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014). Although nominally a unanimous decision, the Justices split five-to-four on precisely how narrowly to
define the recess appointment power. Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer held that
the Senate’s “pro forma sessions count as sessions, not periods of recess,” id. at 2574, and
that a recess of less than ten days was not sufficient to enable use of the recess appointment
power, explaining that “a recess of more than 3 days but less than 10 days is presumptively
too short to fall within the Clause.” Id. at 2554. Justice Breyer’s majority opinion is an
exercise in pragmatic formalism—which is likely why Justice Kennedy joined it, providing a
crucial fifth vote. Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Associate Justices
Thomas and Alito, authored a nominally concurring opinion, which was really more in the
nature of a dissent. See id. at 2592–2618 (Scalia, J., concurring). The concurring bloc
would have severely restricted the scope of the recess appointment power by (1) limiting it
to vacancies that occur when the Senate is in recess and (2) disallowing use of the recess
appointment power based on intrasession breaks within a single session of Congress. See
id. at 2602, 2605–06. Justice Scalia complained that “[t]he majority replaces the Constitution’s text with a new set of judge-made rules to govern recess appointments.” Id. at 2617.
The most remarkable aspect of Noel Canning is not the majority’s failure to use a strictly
textualist mode of analysis, but rather the fact that the Solicitor General’s proposed functionalist analysis of the Recess Appointments Clause failed to garner even a single vote
from any of the Justices. Justice Breyer’s opinion reflects a pragmatic formalism that takes
historical practice into account when reading ambiguous constitutional text. By clearly
holding that the Senate, and the Senate alone, determines whether it is in session for
purposes of the Recess Appointments Clause, the Noel Canning majority embraced formalist, rather than functionalist, reasoning. See id. at 2574 (“We hold that, for purposes of the
Recess Appointments Clause, the Senate is in session when it says it is, provided that, under
its own rules, it retains the capacity to transact Senate business.”).
106 Krotoszynski, supra note 30, at 1615–23 (discussing and critiquing the major formalist Roberts Court separation of powers decisions).
107 See Strauss, supra note 11, at 2262–64 (describing and discussing the traditional
understanding of Humphrey’s Executor as permitting the imposition of “for cause” protections against removal of executive branch officers).
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good cause removal protection unconstitutional.108 The question that now
must be resolved is the precise scope of application of the new formalism and
its enhanced requirement of meaningful presidential oversight of independent federal agencies.109
C.

Assessing the Potential Scope of Free Enterprise Fund
and the New Formalism

The remaining question is the potential scope of the Free Enterprise Fund
principle that the separation of powers requires that the President enjoy sufficient ability to oversee the operations of independent federal agencies so as
to render these entities reasonably accountable to him (and the President
accountable to the citizenry for them). Professor Strauss suggests that “[t]he
underlying issue, as both [the Free Enterprise Fund and Freytag] opinions recognize, is finding a way of accommodating the prolixity of government structures Congress creates without teaching Congress how to avoid the
President’s constitutionally necessary role as our unitary executive.”110 In
other words, the majority has failed to provide clear guidance regarding the
scope and application of the principle it announced. Even so, however, the
clear consensus among administrative law scholars is that the decision could
easily have very broad implications for Congress’s ability to create agency
structures that attenuate presidential oversight powers.
Professor Aziz Huq astutely notes that although the actual holding in
Free Enterprise Fund is “modest,” that it nevertheless “rests on an underlying
principle with wider potential implications.”111 Although a reading of Free
Enterprise Fund that limits the scope of the decision’s application solely to twotiered good cause removal provisions would mean that the decision merits
“only passing attention,”112 Huq argues that “[t]he Free Enterprise Fund principle cannot easily be limited to ‘dual for-cause’ regimes.”113
Professor Huq posits that the decision’s logic calls into question virtually
any and all design elements used to insulate independent federal agencies
from presidential control and oversight.114 The precise Free Enterprise Fund
holding might be narrowly stated, but “big things often have small
beginnings.”115
108 Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 496–502.
109 See Strauss, supra note 11, at 2275, 2283 (noting that Free Enterprise Fund clearly
establishes that independent federal agencies fall within the Article II executive branch but
observing, at the same time, that “much remains unresolved”).
110 Id. at 2282.
111 Huq, supra note 19, at 2–3; see also Strauss, supra note 11, at 2275 (“Despite the
mildness of the outcome in the case, the theoretical explanation the majority offered for
its conclusion seems to sweep more broadly than the particulars of the case require.”).
112 Huq, supra note 19, at 3.
113 Id.
114 See id. at 3–4.
115 Id. at 3.
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Professor Kevin Stack suggests that one potential application of Free
Enterprise Fund would be to attack single-layer good cause removal protection
provisions that insulate principal executive officers from presidential
removal.116 He argues that Free Enterprise Fund’s reasoning has “no inherent
limit to dual-level removal protections”117 and posits that “[i]t applies just as
readily to single-layer provisions.”118 In fact, Judge Brett Kavanaugh—whose
dissenting opinion in Free Enterprise Fund at the U.S. Court of Appeals level
provided an excellent road map to the Supreme Court’s ultimate decision119—has already advanced this position.120
We readily concur with Professor Huq’s prediction that “it is only a matter of time before an appropriate lawsuit raises the question of how far Free
Enterprise Fund goes in shifting agency design authority to federal courts
[from Congress].”121 In a similar vein, Professor Strauss observes that “much
remains unresolved.”122 Plainly, myriad issues will require judicial clarification going forward.
In sum, the scholarly consensus strongly suggests that Free Enterprise Fund
will have broad implications for permissible forms of agency structure going
forward. Although most scholarly attention has focused on the future constitutional viability of a single layer of good cause protection against removal for
members of independent federal agencies, we believe that partisan balance
requirements, when coupled with either a good cause removal protection or
a fixed term of office, arguably present an easier target for invalidation
post–Free Enterprise Fund. We elaborate this argument in the sections that
follow.
116 See Stack, supra note 12, at 2414–15.
117 Id. at 2415.
118 Id.
119 See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 685–86,
701–04 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting), rev’d in part, 561 U.S. 477 (2010); see
also Strauss, supra note 11, at 2271 (arguing that Judge Kavanaugh’s “dissenting opinion
hinted at the hope that the Supreme Court, reviewing this decision, would endorse the
position that the President, vested with ‘the executive power,’ must have at least that
degree of authority over agency action as would permit him to remove any government
official exercising executive authority for any reason, free of ‘for cause’ restrictions”).
120 See In re Aiken Cnty., 645 F.3d 428, 439–46 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (arguing that even a single-layer good cause removal provision unduly attenuates the
President’s power to direct and supervise independent federal agencies and therefore violates the separation of powers doctrine).
121 Huq, supra note 19, at 5. Professor Strauss argues that Free Enterprise Fund plainly
requires that the President enjoy a meaningful ability to control and direct independent
federal agencies, but notes that the precise contours of the required relationship remain
undefined. See Strauss, supra note 11, at 2274 (noting that “independent regulatory commissions are seen as an element of government necessarily subject to presidential oversight, because they execute the laws” and positing that “[t]his recognition, too, is most
welcome”). At the same time, however, Strauss asks “[b]ut of just what does that necessary
relationship consist?” and suggests that the Free Enterprise Fund majority does not offer a
satisfactory answer to this question. Id. at 2283.
122 Strauss, supra note 11, at 2283.
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A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF MANDATORY PARTISAN BALANCE
REQUIREMENTS FOR INDEPENDENT FEDERAL AGENCIES

When creating an “independent” administrative agency, Congress routinely imposes a partisan balance requirement on the presidential appointees
who form that body.123 Usually, this takes the form of a mandate that no
more than a bare majority of appointees may be of the same political party.
In order to understand and properly evaluate the constitutional status of this
practice, it seems essential to understand its origins, basis, and purpose. This
Part explores these important issues.
A.

The 1880s: The Rise of the Partisan Balance Requirement

Today, it seems axiomatic that an “independent” agency is one that Congress has imbued with certain characteristics of independence, such as fixed
terms of office,124 protection against removal from office except for good
cause,125 and a mandated split in the partisan affiliation of the agency’s governing body.126 Under the standard historical account,127 the creation of
the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in 1887128 constitutes Congress’s first experimentation with “independent” agency structure.129
Despite this well-accepted supposition, many scholars point out examples of
123 See infra Table 1, for a listing of administrative bodies with mandated partisan balances in their composition.
124 See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 627–32 (1935) (upholding,
against a separation of powers constitutional challenge, the use of a fixed term of office for
members of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)).
125 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 685–96 (1988) (upholding, against a separation
of powers constitutional challenge, limiting removal of independent counsels within the
Department of Justice to “good cause” grounds with judicial review of any such removals).
126 See infra Table 1. The Supreme Court has yet to have the opportunity to decide
whether statutory partisan balance requirements violate the separation of powers. The
closest the issue has come to a formal Supreme Court resolution was FEC v. NRA Political
Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 512 U.S. 1218 (1994). However,
procedural failures kept the Court from weighing in on the substance of the issue. Id., cert.
dismissed, 513 U.S. 88, 99 (1994). For a discussion of this case, see infra notes 318–21 and
accompanying text.
127 See Jay S. Bybee, Agency Expertise, ALJ Independence, and Administrative Courts: The
Recent Changes in Louisiana’s Administrative Procedure Act, 59 LA. L. REV. 431, 437–39 (1999)
(discussing the political history of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) and discussing the creation of other early independent federal agencies).
128 Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379. Congress eventually abolished the ICC in 1995. See ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88, 109 Stat. 803.
129 Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Interstate Commerce Commission—Disintegration of an American Legal Institution, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1984); Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor General Control over Independent Agency Litigation, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 255, 322
n.388 (1994); Angel Manuel Moreno, Presidential Coordination of the Independent Regulatory
Process, 8 ADMIN. L.J. 461, 463 n.2 (1994); Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical
Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1207–08 (1986).
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earlier executive agencies that bore the hallmarks of intrabranch
“independence.”130
Well before 1887 and the creation of the ICC, however, Congress set up
numerous offices “in a quasi-independent fashion.”131 Oftentimes, Congress
“specified qualifications for [these] offices,”132 for instance, by requiring that
the Attorney General be “learned in the law”133 and that members of the
Board of Supervising Inspectors of Steamboats be “selected for their knowledge, skill, and experience.”134 In sum, Congress sought to cabin the President’s freedom both to name and to control federal executive officers from
the time the Constitution came into force and effect.135
Although not precisely contemporary with the creation of the first federal independent agencies, in 1926, Justice Louis Brandeis authored a comprehensive historical analysis that traces the partisan balance requirement to
its origin. In his dissenting opinion in Myers v. United States,136 he explained
that, in his view, historic practice amply validated Congress’s ability to restrict
the President’s removal power by requiring senatorial consent to an
appointee’s removal from office.137 Among these practices, Justice Brandeis
mentioned the enactment of statutes that impose “restrictions on the power
of nomination by requiring political representation.”138
Justice Brandeis specifically identified two federal agencies featuring partisan balance requirements created before the ICC: (1) the “board of elections
in Utah Territory” (1882), and (2) the “Civil Service Commission” (1883).139
130 Professor Jerry Mashaw, for instance, notes that the first regulatory agency established outside the executive department was “not the ICC; it was the Patent Office, created
ninety-seven years earlier.” JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION
5 (2012). Additionally, Professor Mashaw points out that the steamboat regulatory commission of the 1860s bore “relatively independent” characteristics. Id. at 200–02. Professor
Mashaw even goes so far as to call “the conventional story of . . . a chief executive with firm
control over all federal administrative officials . . . a caricature of nineteenth-century federal administrative governance.” Id. at 292.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 93.
134 Act of Aug. 30, 1852, ch. 106, § 18, 10 Stat. 61, 70.
135 See Lawrence Lessig, Readings by Our Unitary Executive, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 175,
176–77, 182–96 (1993) (detailing and discussing Congress’s practice of creating independent executive officers from the time of the federal government’s existence and positing
that this early practice seriously undermines contemporary claims that the President must
enjoy plenary control over all aspects of the executive branch). As Professor Lessig
explains, “the practice of the executive in the early republic was inconsistent, or at least in
tension, with the unitarian’s claim that the executive possesses an inherent power to direct
and control all inferior officers.” Id. at 196 (emphasis added).
136 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
137 Id. at 265–75 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Such practices included the enactment of
“a multitude of laws . . . which limit the President’s power to make nominations, and
which, through the restrictions imposed, may prevent the selection of the person deemed
by him best fitted.” Id. at 265.
138 Id. at 270.
139 Id. at 271 n.51.
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Thus, any chronicle of the partisan balance requirement should begin with
the creation of these two bodies by the Forty-Seventh Congress.
1.

The Utah Commission (Edmunds Act)

In 1882, Congress enacted the “Edmunds Anti-Polygamy Act of 1882”140
in response to growing concern over the rampant practice of bigamy in the
territory of Utah. The Act created the Utah Commission, a “board of five
persons, to be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, not more than three of whom shall be members of one political
party.”141 This appears to constitute Congress’s first use of a partisan balance
requirement.142 The “not-more-than-X-of-the-same-political-party” formulation continues to be the most popular and prevalent formulation of the partisan balance requirement.143
As originally drafted, however, the Edmunds Act did not prefix the ratio
of partisans who would make up the Utah Commission. Instead, the draft bill
simply called for a board of five, “all of whom shall not be members of one
political party.”144 Some senators objected to this formulation, noting that it
would allow the President to seat a commission made up of four appointees
of one political party and a lone minority appointee.145 A motion was made,
and agreed upon, to amend the bill to its final formulation—a three-to-two
partisan split in membership.146
During the floor debates, several senators questioned the constitutionality of several provisions in the bill;147 however, no senator questioned the
propriety of the commission’s mandated partisan balance, nor did any senator question whether such a mandate would unduly encroach on the Presi140 Edmunds Act, ch. 47, 22 Stat. 30 (1882). The Edmunds Act was enacted primarily
for the purpose of eradicating the vestiges of polygamy in the Utah Territory by stripping
offending Mormons of the right to vote.
141 Edmunds Act § 9 (emphasis added).
142 In comments on the Senate floor, Senator Edmunds reminded his colleagues that
the requirement that the commissioners not all be of the same party “follow[ed] the
famous jury bill that we passed three or four years ago.” 13 CONG. REC. 1155 (1882).
Despite best efforts, a “jury bill” with a mandated partisan split could not be found in the
Congressional Record between 1876 and 1882. Perhaps the bill passed the Senate, but was
either rejected or amended by the House of Representatives.
143 See, e.g., H.R. 6613, 112th Cong. §§ 101, 102(a) (2d Sess. 2012) (proposing the creation of a “Securities and Derivatives Commission” made up of five members “not more
than three” of whom “shall be members of the same political party”).
144 13 CONG. REC. 1155 (1882).
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Among other things, senators suggested that the bill constituted an ex post facto
law, id. at 1197; objected that the board would possess both quasi-legislative and quasijudicial powers, raising serious separation of powers problems, id. at 1156; and argued that
the board could impose criminal punishment without a constitutionally required jury trial,
id. at 1200.
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dent’s ability to execute the new law.148 This trend carried over to the
House, where the debate focused on the method of paying the Commissioners, rather than on constitutional concerns related to the Commission’s mandated partisan balance.149 However, as other portions of the debate
demonstrate, Congress was keenly aware that its enactments could unconstitutionally infringe upon executive powers. For example, Senator George F.
Hoar (R-MA) reminded his colleagues that “Congress cannot . . . extend or
diminish the power of the President to grant pardon[s].”150
This deference to executive power stands in sharp contrast to the bullish
actions of Congress just a few years before. In 1867, Congress adopted the
controversial Tenure of Office Act, which purported to require the Senate’s
consent to the removal of executive branch officers who were initially
appointed to their offices with the Senate’s advice and consent.151 Far more
than an unintended encroachment on executive power, the Tenure of Office
Act was an “open confrontation” between Congress and the President over
the power to oversee principal executive officers.152 This legislation ultimately set the stage for the impeachment of President Andrew Johnson.153
Although the Senate failed to convict President Johnson of the House’s articles of impeachment (by a single vote),154 the Tenure of Office Act, and
identical subsequent enactments,155 remained in the U.S. Code until Myers
held such restrictions on the President’s removal power to be unconstitutional on separation of powers grounds.156
148 In fact, in response to the objections of his colleagues in both houses, Representative Townsend (R-OH) boldly “def[ied] any gentleman to put his finger upon a single
provision [of the bill] that is in conflict with the Constitution.” Id. at 1867.
149 Members of the House were primarily concerned with whether these new “officers
of the United States” would be paid from the U.S. Treasury, rather than from Utah legislative funds. Id. at 1847. The partisan balance requirement went unmentioned. See, e.g., id.
at 1845 (containing remarks by Representative Converse (D-OH) thoroughly describing
the commission, its powers and duties, but omitting any mention of the partisan balance
requirement).
150 Id. at 1154 (“Congress cannot constitutionally extend or diminish the power of the
President to grant pardon or amnesty, and cannot confer upon him any authority which he
has not now . . . .”).
151 Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430. In addition to the Tenure of Office Act,
Congress in 1867 passed the Army Appropriations Act, which purported to require the
Senate’s consent to the removal of the General of the Army. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST,
GRAND INQUESTS 210 (1992). President Johnson signed this legislation into law “with a
protest as to its constitutionality.” Id.
152 REHNQUIST, supra note 151, at 209.
153 See id. at 210–16; see also Huq, supra note 19, at 11 (discussing the Tenure of Office
Act).
154 MASHAW, supra note 130, at 235.
155 See, e.g., Act of July 12, 1876, ch. 179, 19 Stat. 78, 80 (purporting to require the
Senate’s advice and consent for removal of postmasters). The Supreme Court held this
statute unconstitutional in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
156 Myers, 272 U.S. at 176 (“[T]he Tenure of Office Act of 1867, in so far as it attempted
to prevent the President from removing executive officers who had been appointed by him
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, was invalid, and that subsequent legisla-
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The Civil Service Commission (Pendleton Act)

By the early 1880s, an established system of political patronage, commonly called the “spoils system,” had permeated the federal government,
leading to “rampant government waste and inefficiency.”157 In 1882, Congress took the charge of bringing about meaningful civil service reform. Senator George H. Pendleton (D-OH) introduced a bill providing “for the
appointment by the President of a commission of five persons, of different
political parties,” to oversee the much-needed overhaul.158 As it eventually
appeared in the Statutes at Large, the Pendleton Act authorized the President to “appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, three
persons, not more than two of whom shall be adherents of the same party, as Civil
Service Commissioners.”159
According to the bill’s proponents, structural “independence” was essential to the Commission’s success.160 Such independence from other government powers would prevent the new agency from becoming entangled, or
being perceived by the public as being entangled, in the patronage system
that Congress charged the Commission with eradicating.161
No one on the Senate floor debated the propriety of creating a new
regulatory body to oversee these reforms; rather, senators primarily debated
what removal provisions would protect the members of this new federal
agency. Although Pendleton’s original draft was silent as to terms in office,
some senators proposed that service be limited to a term of years, proposing
three commissioners, with terms of two, four, and six years, and six years after
that.162 The goal of staggered terms was straightforward—administrative
independence in the face of political vicissitudes during a change of administration. However, other senators objected to a set “term of years,” arguing
tion of the same effect was equally so.”); see also Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting
Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 494 n.3 (2010) (noting that even before Myers, the Tenure of
Office Act’s “requirement was widely regarded as unconstitutional and void (as it is universally regarded today)”).
157 Lydia Segal, Can We Fight the New Tammany Hall?: Difficulties of Prosecuting Political
Patronage and Suggestions for Reform, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 507, 508 (1998).
158 14 CONG. REC. 207 (1882).
159 Act of Jan. 16, 1883, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403 (emphasis added).
160 14 CONG. REC. 206–07, 249. As originally reported out of committee, the Pendleton
bill called for five commissioners, two of which were to be selected from within the departments in Washington. Id. at 248–49. The Senate eventually agreed on a commission of
three persons, appointed by the President and subject to Senate confirmation, wholly independent of the executive departments. Id. at 323. Some senators fought the decrease in
the number of commissioners, noting that “the presence of five of these commissioners
enlarged the opportunity for counsel and comparison of views.” Id.
161 In support of excluding department members from sitting on the commission, Senator William B. Allison (R-IA) stated, “I think if we are to have a civil-service commission . . . we ought to have an independent body . . . . That is the chief reason why I suggest
an independent commission.” Id. at 249.
162 Id. at 243.
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that such terms would not “leave the chief [executive] with the fullest responsibility” for the Commission’s actions.163
Evidence exists in the recorded floor debates that some senators viewed
presidential acquiescence as a means of justifying legislative encroachments
into executive branch powers. One senator stated that “when a man shall
sign the bill as President and give it his constitutional assent . . . he accepts it
as his own and thereby pledges himself before the country to execute the
provisions of any act to which he has put his hand.”164 Senator Edmunds
agreed that when the President signs a bill, the President agrees to “suitable
regulations for the exercise of admitted powers,” including the power of
appointment.165 Thus, it seems plausible to posit that the Senate believed
that the President acquiesced in the restrictions imposed by the partisan balance requirement when he put his hand to the Act.166 However, senators
were quick to note that the President “can not abdicate his powers, and Congress may not diminish them nor add to them.”167 But, given the lack of
debate on the matter, it seems that the Forty-Seventh Congress did not view
limitations on the President’s power to appoint free of legislative qualifications as presenting any serious constitutional questions.
Despite the absence of debate on the partisan balance requirement, it is
clear from the record that Congress certainly appreciated the importance of
the President’s constitutional appointment power. For example, Senator
Wilkinson Call (D-FL) argued that “[t]his power of appointment is the great
means provided by the Constitution by which the President and his heads of
Departments shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”168 Similarly, in the midst of a debate on civil service qualifications, Senator John A.
Logan (R-IL) quoted the Appointments Clause verbatim and then stated that
if that “provision of the Constitution means anything, it means that the
appointing power is in the President” alone.169 In his view, the Senate’s role
was limited to consenting to and confirming the President’s appointees.170

163 Id. at 244.
164 Id. at 323.
165 Id. at 325.
166 For a discussion of the viability of presidential acquiescence as a means of justifying
partisan balance requirements, see infra note 240 and accompanying text.
167 14 CONG. REC. at 323. The Supreme Court recently has embraced this point of view,
noting that although an individual President might acquiesce in a separation of powers
violation, he cannot “choose to bind his successors by diminishing their powers, nor can he
escape responsibility for his choices by pretending that they are not his own.” Free Enter.
Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 497 (2010).
168 14 CONG. REC. at 499 (remarks of Sen. Wilkinson Call (D-FL)) (commencing after
Sen. Call’s quotation of the Faithful Execution Clause).
169 Id. at 326.
170 Id. at 327.
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The Presumed Constitutionality of Mandatory Partisan Balance
Requirements

The legislative history of the Edmunds Act and the Pendleton Act both
demonstrate that Congress did not foresee any constitutional difficulties with
imposing statutory limits on the presidential appointment power. Congress
neither asked nor answered the question whether the legislature may constitutionally designate the partisan identity of a principal executive officer.171
To be sure, Congress did reflect on the separation of powers ramifications of
creating executive officers who would be insulated from direct forms of presidential control and oversight—particularly on questions associated with fixed
terms of office and limits on midstream removal from office. However, the
partisan balance requirement did not generate any substantive debate; it
went unaddressed. Thus, when first experimenting with the structure of
independent federal agencies and partisan balance requirements, Congress
simply presumed that it possessed the constitutional authority to so limit the
President’s power to appoint principal executive officers.172
B.

The Partisan Balance Requirement in the Twentieth Century

After the creation of the Civil Service Commission in 1883 and the ICC
in 1887, Congress began to deploy the device of “independent” agencies ever
more frequently. The twentieth century was marked with the creation of
myriad independent executive agencies, and most of these featured organic
acts that mandated partisan balance in agency composition.173 One can
attribute the increasing prevalence of partisan balance requirements in independent agency organic acts to legislative acceptance of the practice as a constitutional means of bringing about bipartisanship, as well as limited judicial
and presidential acquiescence to the practice. It was not until the 1990s, over
100 years after Congress first adopted such restrictions on presidential
appointments, that a President expressly objected to a legislative requirement for partisan balance within an independent federal agency.174

171 In a similar manner, when Congress created the bipartisan ICC just a few years later
in 1887, “[t]here was little general or philosophical discussion of the separation of powers
in connection with the establishment of the commission.” ROBERT E. CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 58 (Octagon Books 1972) (1941).
172 See, e.g., HENRY B. HOGUE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33886, STATUTORY QUALIFICATIONS FOR EXECUTIVE BRANCH POSITIONS 18 (2010) (citing as the basis for Congress’s
authority to place statutory qualifications on executive officers “[t]he preponderance of
evidence and historical practice” (emphasis added)).
173 See infra Table 1.
174 See infra notes 222–28 and accompanying text.
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Congress’s Continued Embrace of Partisan Balance Requirements in
the Early Twentieth Century

Nearly twenty years passed between the creation of the ICC and Congress’s next use of a statutory partisan balance requirement.175 In 1914, Congress ended this hiatus by creating the FTC, mandating a three-to-two
political split in its members.176 Then in a flurry of activity in 1916, Congress
created three new regulatory bipartisan commissions. One of these included
the agency that would eventually become the International Trade Commission. Then known as the “Tariff Commission,” Congress created the Commission to ensure the competitiveness of U.S. goods in booming
international markets.177
In an address to industry leaders, Senator Thomas Gore (D-OK), a chief
proponent of a national agency on international trade, spoke of the propriety of creating an international trade commission.178 Regarding the commission’s composition, Senator Gore envisioned that:
The commission should consist of an even number of commissioners—say
six. Not more than three of these should be of any one political party. To
make the number odd you impeach in advance either its capacity or its
sincerity. . . . An even number would be a mark of confidence and would be
an added assurance of its fitness and efficiency.179

By utilizing such a composition—an even split of partisans—and staffing the
agency with nonpolitical “experts and trained economists,” the commission
“would be less liable to change with the violent vicissitudes of party politics”
and would be “less affected by the bias and prejudice of partisan
controversy.”180
Clearly, a nongovernment-like “independence” through the aegis of
bipartisanship was the key feature sought.181 And, yet, the potential ill-effects
of forcing the President to appoint members of the opposition party to principal executive offices appears to have gone completely unconsidered. Congress simply presumed that it could prescribe the partisan composition of
independent federal regulatory entities.
175 See infra Table 1.
176 Federal Trade Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 63-203, 38 Stat. 717 (1914).
177 S. REP. NO. 64-243, at 3 (1916).
178 Id.
179 Id. at 8.
180 Id. at 5.
181 Industry leaders also called for an independent commission to control tariffs. Senator Gore introduced into the record a series of four correspondences from academics and
industry leaders favoring a nonpartisan body. Edward A. Filene, a successful Boston entrepreneur, counseled Senator Gore that a commission of “three Republicans and three Democrats” would bring “great advantage” and that the bill’s “chance of being passed at the
next session of Congress will be largely increased thereby.” Letter from Edward A. Filene
to Senator Thomas Gore (Nov. 15, 1915), reprinted in 53 CONG. REC. 1550 (1916).
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This proposed board of experts was to wield “broader [and] more general powers” than any other federal agency yet in existence.182 Senator
Albert B. Cummins (R-IA) envisioned that these experts would be
three of the biggest and brainiest Democrats in the United States and three
of the biggest and brainiest Republicans in the United States—three men
who believe in the theory which our Democratic friends adopt for a tariff law
and three men who believe in the theory or policy which the Republican
Party adopts for a tariff law.183

Senator Cummins credited the idea that expertise, as if by magic, would
overcome partisan paralysis. He opined that “if the President of the United
States fails in his appointments to recognize the real spirit of this law, he will be
false to the duty which the statute will impose upon him.”184 The overriding
goal of expertise through bipartisanship carried over to the House as well.185
President Woodrow Wilson squarely addressed Senator Cummins’s concern that the President might fail to make the best appointments. In a letter
addressed to the Senate, Wilson argued that an “unpartisan inquiry” was
needed into the United States’ international trade situation and that an
international trade “board as much as possible free from any strong prepossession in favor of any political policy and capable of looking at the whole
economic situation of the country with a dispassionate and disinterested scrutiny”186 was requisite. One potential means of avoiding a “strong prepossession” to favor either political party would be to legislate a three-to-three
bipartisan split in the Board’s membership. Moreover, the President’s
appeal for the creation of an “unpartisan” board removed any residual
doubts that the Senate might have harbored about the constitutionality of
the restriction. After all, if the President himself acquiesced in the creation
of a body with a mandatory partisan balance requirement, what objection
could there be to the adoption of such a requirement?
As was the case with previous bills containing partisan balance requirements, the Tariff Commission’s partisan balance requirement did not garner
any attention in floor debates. However, the Senate did afford significant
consideration to the process through which the Commission’s chairman and
vice chairman were to be selected. As it entered committee, the tariff bill
provided that the President would designate a chairman and vice chairman
once every two years.187 Senator Cummins proposed amending the bill to
allow the President to designate the chairmen “annually instead of bienni182 53 CONG. REC. 13,803 (1916) (statement of Sen. Simmons).
183 Id. at 13,845 (statement of Sen. Cummins).
184 Id. (emphasis added).
185 Id. at 1768 (statement of Rep. Borland (D-MO)) (arguing that he would not limit
the commission to one “theory of tariff, because if [he] did it would not be a nonpartisan
tariff commission”).
186 Letter from President Woodrow Wilson to Representative Claude Kitchin (Jan. 24,
1916), reprinted in 53 CONG. REC. 10,529 (1916).
187 53 CONG. REC. 13,794–95 (1916).
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ally.”188 When prodded on the necessity of this change, Senator Cummins
intimated that he preferred an arrangement that allowed the Commission’s
power to rest closer to the President:
It is thought desirable for this reason: The effort in this bill . . . is to create a
commission which shall reflect the varying political or economic opinions of
the political parties. It is, therefore, to be composed of persons no more
than three of whom shall be members of one political party. It seems, therefore, that it is wise as nearly as possible, to get the chairman of the commission in
political or economic harmony with the President of the United States, and it would,
as it seems to me, be wise to permit the President to designate the chairman
and vice chairman every year.189

This idea, that the Commission would better perform its duties if its leaders
were aligned with the President, plainly reflects concerns quite consonant
with the unitary executive theory.190
Even though three of the six commissioners would not be political fellow
travelers with the President, Senator Cummins believed that the President
should be able to choose the chair and vice chair that best represented the
President’s policy interests (i.e., members of his own political party). Senator
Cummins’s remarks also indicate that some in the Senate believed that the
President should have a means of supervising, if not controlling, the work of
the Commission despite its fifty-fifty partisan split. This ability to name the
Commission’s leadership, in turn, would give the President more effective
ability to supervise the execution of the tariff act.191
A few years later, Congress once again embraced administrative expertise, achieved through a bipartisan commission, when it revamped the
nation’s securities exchange laws in the Securities Act of 1934. The prior
securities act, enacted in 1933, vested its administration in the existing Federal Trade Commission.192 The 1934 Act provided for “a separate commission, an independent commission, to be appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Senate, to consist of five members.”193 In summarizing the
Securities Act’s features, Senator Duncan U. Fletcher (D-FL) elaborated that
“Section 4 establishes the Federal exchange commission about which we have
been talking, a commission to be composed of five members, selected by the

188 Id. at 13,795 (remarks of Sen. Cummins).
189 Id. (emphasis added).
190 See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 9, at 596 (arguing that the Constitution dictates
that “the President exclusively controls the power to execute all federal laws, and therefore
it must be the case that all inferior executive officers act in his stead”).
191 This was very magnanimous of Senator Cummins, a Republican, during the election
year of 1916, in which Woodrow Wilson secured another term as President and four more
years to name the chair and vice chair of the Tariff Commission.
192 78 CONG. REC. 8162 (1934) (remarks of Sen. Duncan U. Fletcher (D-FL)).
193 Id.
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President, and so forth.”194 The “and so forth” included a mandated three-totwo partisan split in the commission’s members.195
By the time Congress created the independent agencies of the 1930s, its
members plainly considered mandated partisan balances to be part and parcel of the necessary attributes of those agencies—“and so forth.” Thus, from
the nineteenth century into the twentieth, the standard template for independent federal agencies included fixed terms of office, protections against
midterm removal except for good cause (and with judicial review available
for any such removals), and, of course, a partisan balance requirement.
2.

The Judiciary’s Limited Embrace of Partisan Balance Requirements

Congress’s unquestioned acceptance of the propriety and constitutionality of mandated partisan splits in executive agency heads might have been
fueled by the Supreme Court’s arguable endorsement of such provisions during the early twentieth century. In 1903, the Supreme Court had to decide
the legality of President William McKinley’s removal of an appraiser, Ferdinand N. Shurtleff, from the Federal Board of General Appraisers.196 Holding that the removal was constitutional, Justice Rufus Wheeler Peckham
quoted the portion of the Board’s organic act providing for appointment,
including the requirement that “[n]ot more than five of such general
appraisers shall be appointed from the same political party.”197
Writing for the Shurtleff majority, Justice Peckham opined that “[t]here
is, of course, no doubt of the power of Congress to create such an office as is
provided for in the above section.”198 At first blush, this seems to express
that there is “no doubt” of the power of Congress to impose a partisan balance requirement such as the one that Justice Peckham described. However,
whether the Court’s lack of doubt fully embraced the partisan balance
requirement that cabined the President’s appointment power is not entirely
clear. After all, the Court only spoke to Congress’s power to “create” these
offices; it did not purport to express an opinion on the exact qualifications
Congress imposed on the presidential appointees. Nor did the Court purport to opine on the effect such qualifications had on the President’s duty to
“faithfully execute” the law charged to those offices. On the other hand, if
limiting the President’s ability to name political fellow travelers to federal
boards and commissions presented a serious separation of powers problem, it
does seem odd that the Supreme Court failed to point out this constitutional
defect (or even to flag it in passing).199
194 Id. at 8164 (emphasis added)
195 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2012) (“There is hereby established a Securities and Exchange
Commission . . . to be composed of five commissioners. . . . [N]ot more than three of such
commissioners shall be members of the same political party . . . .”).
196 See infra note 424 (discussing the Board of General Appraisers).
197 Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311, 313 (1903).
198 Id.
199 See, e.g., White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Emp’rs, 460 U.S. 204, 214 n.12 (1983)
(noting, but not deciding, an independent constitutional objection to minimum hiring
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And, as noted earlier,200 Justice Brandeis’s dissent in the iconic Myers v.
United States, decided some years later in 1926, might have provided support
for the notion that Congress may constitutionally “restrict the exercise by the
President of the power of nomination.”201 Justice Brandeis pointed to a
string of qualifications used by Congress to narrow the President’s choice of
nominees, including “restrictions on the power of nomination by requiring
political representation.”202 Justice Brandeis noted that this requirement
existed in “a multitude of laws [that] have been enacted which limit the President’s power to make nominations, and which . . . prevent the selection of
the person deemed by him best fitted. Such restriction[s] upon the power to
nominate [have] been exercised by Congress continuously since the foundation of the Government.”203 Because of this historical practice, Justice Brandeis found it unnecessary to question whether Congress had such power.204
It also seems that the Congresses of the early twentieth century likewise
found the answer to this question both obvious and easy, and hence deemed
it unnecessary to even ask it.
In a separate dissent in Myers v. United States, Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr. also lent credence to the notion that Congress may constitutionally restrict a President’s power of appointment and removal. In his view,
expressed over three succinct paragraphs, the power of Congress to create an
office carried with it the power to abolish the office, establish a fixed term of
office, or require senatorial consent to removal.205 Because “Congress alone
confers on the President the power to appoint,” that power was necessarily
subject to any restrictions that Congress might impose.206 Finally, in a narrow reading of the Faithful Execution Clause, Justice Holmes concluded that
“[t]he duty of the President to see that the laws be executed is a duty that
does not go beyond the laws or require him to achieve more than Congress
requirements for city residents, observing that “[t]his question has not been, to any great
extent, briefed or argued in this Court,” and simply “remand[ing] without passing on its
merits”). However, only a year later, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on this issue
and reached the merits in United Building & Construction Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden,
465 U.S. 208 (1984). Thus, even if the Supreme Court is not inclined to decide a question
not presented, it is certainly capable of flagging it as both relevant and intentionally undecided. See generally Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Constitutional Flares: On Judges, Legislatures,
and Dialogue, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1998) (arguing that “[j]udges could endeavor to
engage legislators more directly on matters of mutual institutional concern”); id. at 7–8
(arguing that a dialogue between courts and legislative and executive officers about the
constitutionality of particular government programs or policies could be beneficial and
positing that “[i]f such [judicial] advice better enables legislators and executive branch
personnel to avoid unconstitutional actions, then one could plausibly argue that the dialogue enhances, rather than debases, the legislative process”).
200 See supra notes 136–39 and accompanying text.
201 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 264 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
202 Id. at 270.
203 Id. at 265.
204 Id. at 275.
205 Id. at 177 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
206 Id.
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sees fit to leave within his power.”207 Under this approach, Congress enjoys a
seemingly unlimited power to restrict the appointment or removal of executive officers (in direct conflict with the imperatives of the contemporary unitary executive theory).208
3.

Signs of Presidential Acquiescence to Restrictions of the Appointment
Power

Finally, and perhaps most striking, is the fact that the executive branch
has come very close to conceding the propriety of the partisan balance
requirement before the Supreme Court. In 1935, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt purported to fire William E. Humphrey, a sitting member of the
FTC, after Humphrey refused to honor repeated requests from President
Roosevelt that he resign his office prior to the expiration of his term. Consistent with the President’s view that Humphrey had been lawfully removed
from office, the Roosevelt Administration declined to pay Humphrey his salary as an FTC commissioner from the time the President had removed
Humphrey from office and until his death (which had preceded the end of
his fixed term of office).209
Before the Supreme Court, the Roosevelt Administration lost its argument that the President, as the repository of the full executive power and
incident to his duty to ensure faithful execution of the laws, had the inherent
power to remove a sitting FTC commissioner in whom he lacked confidence.210 Writing for the majority, Justice George Sutherland upheld Congress’s decision to restrict the President’s removal power to good “cause” and
also found that a mere policy disagreement with a sitting FTC commissioner
appointed by a prior administration of a different political party did not meet
this standard.211 The Court expressly held “that no removal can be made
207 Id.
208 See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 9, at 589 (arguing that sound interpretation of
the Faithful Execution Clause forecloses the possibility that Congress holds the power to
“determine who will ‘carry[ ] into execution’ its laws”).
209 Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 618–19 (1935).
210 Id. at 627–32.
211 See id. at 631–32. But cf. Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 9, at 1165–66 (arguing that
the President has inherent constitutional authority to fire any person within the executive
branch and thus rejecting the holding of Humphrey’s Executor as inconsistent with the
imperatives of the unitary executive); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Hail to the Chief Administrator: The Framers and the President’s Administrative Powers, 102 YALE L.J. 991, 992 (1993)
(positing that “[w]henever an official is granted statutory discretion, the Constitution
endows the President with the authority to control that discretion” (footnote omitted)).
Calabresi and Rhodes are very clear that, in their view, the unitary executive theory “renders unconstitutional independent agencies and counsels to the extent that they exercise
discretionary executive power.” Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 9, at 1165–66 (internal
footnote omitted). As one of us had previously observed, “[t]he unitary-executive theory,
at least in its strongest iteration, would nullify all limits on presidential control of independent agencies that exercise policymaking authority, such as the Federal Communications
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during the prescribed term for which the officer is appointed, except for one
or more of the causes named in the applicable statute.”212
In its brief to the Supreme Court, the Roosevelt Administration argued
that the “independence” that Congress had conveyed to the FTC did not
“depend upon an implied limitation of the removal power” as urged by
Humphrey’s executor.213 Rather, the Roosevelt Administration contended
that Congress had provided “in unmistakable terms for other safeguards
designed to achieve” independence.214 These included the requirement that
commissioners “represent more than one political party.”215 Although not
affirmatively stating that these “other safeguards” were without constitutional
defect, the government implied that such measures, when Congress adopted
them, were constitutionally justified because they brought about desirable
“independence” from plenary presidential control. By arguing that the adequacy of these features of independence made strict enforcement of the forcause removal limitation unnecessary, the Roosevelt Administration appears
to have tacitly accepted statutory provisions that restrict presidential appointment to “a bare majority of the members . . . [from] the same political
party.”216
There is more than a little logic, however, to the Roosevelt Administration’s position. If Article II’s Vesting and Faithful Execution Clauses require
that the President be permitted to define “good cause” as she deems fit, then
the potential effects of a partisan balance requirement would be much
reduced.217 If the President named an obstructionist member to the FTC,
she could simply remove him from office before the expiration of his term of
office. Thus, it is the combination of a partisan balance requirement with
limitations on removal that create a problem with the President’s ability to
oversee and direct the operations of independent federal agencies (like the
FTC).218 If Congress or the federal courts were to remove either the partisan
balance requirement (so that the President enjoys a free hand in naming
principal executive officers) or the limitation on the power to remove a sitting board or commission member, the separation of powers problem would
be, if not entirely resolved, then at least substantially reduced in scope.
As the history of the twentieth century demonstrates, Presidents generally have accepted partisan balance requirements as a matter of course and
Commission or the Federal Reserve Bank of the United States.” Krotoszynski, supra note
30, at 1608–09.
212 Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 632.
213 Brief for the United States at 18, Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. 602 (No. 667).
214 See id. (emphasis added) (“The Commission was left free from the continuing
supervision of a department head; its membership was required to represent more than
one political party; and the terms of its members were arranged to expire at different
times. In later Acts creating similar commissions these factors alone have apparently been
deemed sufficient to secure the objective of an independent body.”).
215 Id.
216 Id. at 19.
217 See infra notes 272–73, 359–63 and accompanying text.
218 See infra notes 272–73, 359–63 and accompanying text.
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signed organic acts containing such requirements without question or public
objection. However, there is one key example of a presidential objection to
such an encroachment on the appointment power: on March 19, 1992, President George H.W. Bush signed into law Senate Bill 2184, establishing the
Morris K. Udall and Steward L. Udall Foundation.219 The bill employed a
complex scheme of qualifications for the presidential appointees who would
make up the Foundation’s Board of Trustees.220 Among the myriad requirements for Board appointees, the bill prohibited certain trustees from being
members “of the same political party.”221
Although he chose to sign the bill, President Bush noted in his signing
statement that he viewed the appointment restrictions “as precatory” only.222
In the President’s view, under “the Appointments Clause of the Constitution . . . congressional participation in such appointments may be exercised
only through the Senate’s advice and consent with respect to Presidential
nominees.”223 President Bush argued that imposing a precondition to
appointment, including a partisan balance requirement, violated this principle and, hence, the separation of powers doctrine.224
Members of Congress, including members of the Senate’s leadership,
did not simply acquiesce to President Bush’s challenge to the use of
mandatory partisan balance requirements. Contemporary news accounts
quoted Senator Dennis DeConcini (D-AZ) as characterizing President Bush’s
position as “a foolish argument.”225 In a more sustained and formal argument, then-Majority Leader Senator George J. Mitchell (D-ME) took to the
Senate floor to set forth the views of the Senate’s majority caucus.226 He
suggested that President Bush’s constitutional objections to the statutory
219 Morris K. Udall Scholarship and Excellence in National Environmental and Native
American Public Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-259, 106 Stat. 78.
220 See infra Table 1.
221 20 U.S.C. § 5603(b)(3) (2012).
222 Statement on Signing the Morris K. Udall Scholarship and Excellence in National
Environmental and Native American Public Policy Act of 1992, 28 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
DOCS . 483, 507 (Mar. 23, 1992) [hereinafter Udall Foundation Signing Statement]. The President had also objected to a prior version of the bill, which called for four trustees to be
appointed by Congress, on the grounds that such an arrangement “would violate the Constitution.” Paul Horwitz, Pocket-Veto Conflict Ducked as House OKs Udall Scholarship Bill, ROLL
CALL, Mar. 16, 1992, available at LEXIS, News Library, ROLLCL File. After Congress
removed these objectionable provisions, President Bush signed the successor bill despite
his objection to the bill’s partisan balance requirement—“[f]idelity to the constitutional
analysis that provoked the first veto thus proved less than thoroughgoing.” Nelson Lund,
Lawyers and the Defense of the Presidency, 1995 BYU L. REV. 17, 47.
223 Udall Foundation Signing Statement, supra note 222, at 507.
224 Id.
225 Ellen Gamerman, President Signs Udall Bill into Law: Bush Statement Takes Shot at Senate, STATES NEWS SERV., Mar. 19, 1992, available at LEXIS, News Library, SNS File.
226 138 CONG. REC. 8689 (1992) (statement of Sen. Mitchell); see also HOGUE, supra
note 172, at 4–5 & n.17 (summarizing the debate between President Bush and Senator
Mitchell over the meaning of the Appointments Clause).
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qualifications for appointees were “disturbing”227 and constituted an attack
on a provision simply “intended to promote the nonpartisanship which was
important in the Congress’ bipartisan support of [the] measure.”228
Senator Mitchell argued that President Bush’s signing statement was
both “wrong and without any basis in history or law.”229 In support of the
proposition that history was on Congress’s side, Senator Mitchell proceeded
to summarize the historical acceptance of statutory qualifications for executive offices. He listed two offices, the Attorney General and Solicitor General,
which since their inception were required by statute to be filled by appointees “learned in the law.”230 Senator Mitchell then turned to judicial pronouncements, specifically the majority and dissenting opinions of Myers v.
United States,231 which he believed showed that Congress may impose “reasonable and relevant qualifications . . . of eligibility of appointees.”232 So long as
those qualifications “do not so limit selection and so trench upon executive
choice as to be in effect legislative designation,” they should be deemed
entirely constitutional.233 And, drawing from Justice Brandeis’s Myers dissent, partisan balance requirements are one such permissible
qualification.234
Senator Mitchell’s floor speech, a direct point-by-point rebuttal of President Bush’s signing statement, demonstrates quite clearly Congress’s settled
view that history and practice unquestionably support its regular imposition
of partisan balance requirements on presidential appointments to independent federal agencies. Notwithstanding the unitary executive theory and
arguments premised on Article II’s Vesting and Faithful Execution Clauses,
history and practice validate the congressional imposition of partisan balance
on presidential appointees.235 Any potential objections premised on generic
separation of powers theory and practice should be deemed waived—merely
water under the bridge.236 Indeed, the Senator believed that this “construction of the Constitution has become fixed over the past 200 years.”237
227 138 CONG. REC. 8689 (1992) (statement of Sen. Mitchell).
228 Id. at 8690.
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
232 138 CONG. REC. 8690 (1992) (statement of Sen. Mitchell) (quoting Myers, 272 U.S.
at 129).
233 Id. (quoting Myers, 272 U.S. at 128).
234 Id. at 8690–91.
235 Id. at 8691 (arguing that “history is important in constitutional law,” noting that “for
more than 200 years . . . Congress has enacted numerous Federal statutes prescribing qualifications required for appointees to Federal offices that Congress has created,” and observing that “Presidents have approved and abided by [these] provisions”); see also HOGUE,
supra note 172, at 2 (citing as the basis for Congress’s authority to place statutory qualifications on executive officers “the preponderance of evidence and historical practices” (emphasis added)).
236 See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 5, at 414–17.
237 138 CONG. REC. 8691 (1992) (statement of Sen. Mitchell).
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However, markedly absent from the Majority Leader’s argument is any
rational limiting principle or stopping point to Congress’s discretion to limit
the President’s ability to select principal officers who will serve within the
executive branch.238 Nor did Senator Mitchell address how such restrictions
articulate with the President’s duty to ensure that “the Laws be faithfully executed.”239 Regardless of the merits, Congress does not seem much inclined
to consider seriously whether such encroachments are unconstitutional,
given its view that history and consistent practice have validated them;240
Congress’s use of mandatory partisan balance requirements since the 1880s
overbears any contemporary separation of powers objections to this
practice.241
238 We believe that the separation of powers objection relates most clearly, and most
powerfully, to principal officers of the United States—i.e., to those persons who have direct
and substantial responsibility for making policy within the executive branch of the federal
government. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 511
(2010) (holding that the heads of independent agencies are “Hea[ds] of Departmen[ts]”
within the executive branch for purposes of applying the Appointments Clause); Edmond
v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 661–63 (1997) (distinguishing principal and inferior
officers). As Chief Justice Rehnquist observed in Edmond, “[g]enerally speaking, the term
‘inferior officer’ connotes a relationship with some higher ranking officer or officers below
the President: Whether one is an ‘inferior’ officer depends on whether he has a superior.”
Id. at 662; see id. at 663 (observing that “we think it evident that ‘inferior officers’ are
officers whose work is directed and supervised at some level by others who were appointed
by Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate”). Given that the
Supreme Court has squarely held that persons comprising the head of an independent
federal board, commission, or agency constitute “principal officers” and also constitute the
“Head of a Department” for purposes of appointing inferior officers, see Free Enter. Fund,
561 U.S. at 511 (internal alterations omitted), it necessarily follows that those serving on
these entities are plainly principal, not inferior, officers for the purpose of applying the
Vesting and Faithful Execution Clauses as well. The argument should also hold true for
inferior officers (but not for mere employees), although a functionalist analysis might find
that Congress possesses greater leeway to impose partisan balance requirements when
those serving are subject to direct supervision by a superior officer who serves at the pleasure of the President. See Edmond, 520 U.S. at 662–63. We would happily accede to the
proposition that Congress may circumscribe presidential control over the hiring and dismissal of mere federal “employees”—i.e., persons who lack any meaningful ability to make
policy within the executive branch.
239 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
240 Long use and consistent practice can certainly validate a particular practice or serve
to answer a potential constitutional objection. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 5, at
417–24, 427–30, 432–38. But, consistent historical use, and even presidential acquiescence
over time are not necessarily controlling factors in contemporary separation of powers
analysis. The legislative veto was a common feature of many delegations of policymaking
authority to the executive branch, from the time of FDR to 1983. See INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919, 967–68 (1983) (White, J., dissenting). This fact did not save the so-called “legislative veto” from judicial invalidation on separation of powers grounds. See id. at 958–59
(majority opinion).
241 Interestingly, the dispute between Congress and the President over qualifications of
officers of the United States was not the only one that arose during the George H.W. Bush
presidency. In 1992, Congress passed S. 2733, providing for the creation of the Office of
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Save for the George H.W. Bush Administration, Presidents have rarely
challenged statutory qualifications for office and have simply accepted partisan balance requirements as a settled feature of the contemporary administrative state’s basic design. And, as mentioned earlier in this Article,
evidence suggests that Congress has relied on presidential acquiescence to
support its use of statutory qualifications for executive officers.242 The next
subsection considers whether such reliance is appropriate.
C.

Acceptance Leads to Even Greater Encroachment

Into recent times, Congress continues to make the partisan balance
requirement a key means of ensuring agency independence.243 Since 1989,
approximately 950 bills have been introduced in Congress that propose to
create some new federal administrative body with a mandated split in political party representation among its members.244 As some in Congress have
boasted, partisan balance requirements “may be found from near the beginning to near the end of the 50 titles of the United States Code.”245
This continued reliance on mandated partisan balance requirements is
the result of Congress’s belief that it may constitutionally wield this power
over executive branch appointments.246 It also reflects the legislative
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight. See Housing and Community Development Act of
1992, Pub. L. No. 102-550, 106 Stat. 3672. Before President Bush signed the measure, the
Department of Justice’s Office of Legislative Affairs wrote a letter to the Senate “rais[ing]
questions as to the constitutionality of . . . the prescription of minimal qualifications for the
person nominated as Director,” among other things. S. REP. NO. 102-282, at 85 (1992).
The Department of Justice asserted that “other than the constitutional disqualification of
Members of Congress from being an officer of the United States in Article I, Sec. 2, ‘[a]ll
other limitations are incompatible with the President’s appointment power.’” Id. (quoting
Letter of W. Lee Rawls, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legislative Affairs, to Hon. Donald
W. Riegle, Jr., Chairman, Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate (Apr.
7, 1992)). Much like Senator Mitchell, the Congressional Research Service deflected this
assertion as “without legal foundation and . . . contradicted by Supreme Court opinions
and continuous and consistent historical practice and precedent dating back to the establishment of the Republic.” Id. The Congressional Research Service also cited with
approval Senator Mitchell’s remarks made the previous month in response to President
Bush’s objection to the partisan balance requirement mandated for the Udall Foundation.
Id. at 88.
242 See supra notes 164–67 and accompanying text.
243 See infra Table 1.
244 This figure is arrived at via the following LexisNexis search: Combined Source Set
(Congressional Full Text Bills 101st Congress – Current Congress); Search (“same political
party” or “one political party” and HEADING(intro!)).
245 138 CONG. REC. 8690 (1992) (remarks of Sen. Mitchell (D-ME)) (listing the organic
statutes of seven independent agencies).
246 “Not only does the Senate have the power to confirm a President’s . . . nominations, . . . but the appointment power is given to Congress by the Constitution. In Article
II, the President’s appointment power is limited by the power of Congress.” S. REP. NO.
110-552, at 3 (2008) (discussing President George W. Bush’s use of the recess appointment
to appoint U.S. Attorneys).
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branch’s belief that such limitations on the President’s appointment powers
are necessary to ensure that appointments are made based on relevant expertise and not partisanship247—all with the hope of enhancing the perceived
credibility and operational efficacy of independent federal agencies.248
Congress certainly has embraced with gusto the proposition that historical practice ratifies its power to impose partisan quotas on presidential
appointments to agencies it deems “independent.”249 Additionally, Congress
has even taken the view that it has the power to impose similar requirements
on presidential appointments to agencies housed within cabinet-level departments,250 “Article I” courts,251 and even “Article III” courts.252
Moreover, in recent years, Congress has taken the step of requiring the
President to seek preclearance from Congress before making certain
appointments. The organic act of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight
Board requires that the President appoint, in a somewhat paradoxical fashion, five members “without regard to political affiliation, but in no event shall
more than 3 members of the Board be members of the same political
party.”253 The requirements do not stop there, however. Before appointing
a member who is not of the President’s own party, the President must “consult with the leadership of that party, if any, in the Senate and House of
Representatives.”254 The purpose of this provision is clear: “[T]hose individuals who are not of the same political party as the President can only be
appointed after the President has consulted with the leadership of the nominee’s party.”255
Congress has failed to provide explicit justification for this new requirement on presidential appointment, and this is troubling, given that preappointment “consultation” seems to go far beyond the Senate’s accepted
constitutional role of giving “Advice and Consent”256 to presidential
appointees.
Perhaps the political context of the time explains Congress’s motive for
this novel requirement. In 2007, the time the Oversight Board’s organic act
was amended to include the presidential consultation requirement, both
Houses were controlled by Democratic majorities, and Republican President
George W. Bush had another two years in the White House. Some scholars
247 See supra text accompanying note 185.
248 “This change [that no more than five of the nine Commission members appointed
by the President may be from the same political party] is intended to enhance the credibility of the Commission by ensuring that the Commission is not perceived as a partisan
organization.” 140 CONG. REC. 25,959 (1994).
249 See generally Bradley & Morrison, supra note 5 (discussing the question of historical
practice as a means of establishing a binding gloss on the meaning of the Constitution).
250 See infra Table 2.
251 See infra Table 3.
252 See infra Table 4.
253 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee(h)(2) (2012).
254 Id.
255 153 CONG. REC. 533 (2007) (emphasis added).
256 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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have opined that the greatest push for independence in administrative agencies comes at times when the parties enjoy divided control over Congress (or
at least one house) and the White House.257 No matter the motive, the Oversight Board’s consultation requirement is just the latest example of a means
of securing “independence” that arguably violates the separation of powers
doctrine.
It also bears noting that the executive branch has not simply accepted
limitations on the President’s constitutional appointment power. The opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), a division of the Department of
Justice, provide strong counterevidence of presidential acquiescence in congressional efforts to control presidential appointments.258 In fact, OLC’s formal opinions stand in considerable tension with Senator Mitchell’s history of
a joint or shared vision of the appointment power. Although the OLC has
not consistently branded partisan balance requirements as unconstitutional,
the office has consistently asserted that limits on the President’s appointment
power are constitutionally suspect.
In 1979, during the Carter Administration, OLC issued an opinion concluding that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 did not bar
the President from considering the age of judicial appointees.259 In that
opinion, OLC readily admitted the power of Congress “to prescribe qualifications for office,” including the power to require that the “President appoint
members of both parties to certain kinds of boards and commissions.”260
OLC resolved, however, that the “power of appointment belongs to the President, and it cannot be usurped or abridged by Congress.”261 The “balance”
between these two realms, the opinion stated, depended on the “nature of
the office in question”—the closer the office lies to the President, the more
problematic the qualifications become.262
The 1980s saw two Republican administrations and a broader view of the
proper scope of the President’s appointment power. In 1989, OLC issued an
opinion entitled “Common Legislative Encroachments on executive branch
Authority.”263 Abandoning the notion of “balance” in the 1979 opinion, the
OLC asserted:
Congress . . . imposes impermissible qualifications requirements on
principal officers. For instance, Congress will require that a fixed number of
members of certain commissions be from a particular political party. These
requirements . . . violate the Appointments Clause. The only congressional
257 Devins & Lewis, supra note 3, at 464 (arguing that “the percentage of new agencies
with insulating characteristics correlates with periods of divided government” (footnote
omitted)).
258 Bradley & Morrison, supra note 5, at 458.
259 Judges—Appointment—Age Factor, 3 Op. O.L.C. 388, 388 (1979).
260 Id. at 389.
261 Id.
262 Id. (opining that such qualifications would be unconstitutional if imposed on cabinet appointees).
263 Common Legislative Encroachments on Executive Branch Authority, 13 Op. O.L.C.
248 (1989).
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check that the Constitution places on the President’s power to appoint
“principal officers” is the advice and consent of the Senate.264

This robust, highly expansive view of the President’s Article II appointment
power helps to explain the first President Bush’s opposition to the seemingly
innocuous Udall Foundation bill.265
After the election of President Bill Clinton in 1992, OLC again revised
its position regarding the constitutional permissibility of mandatory partisan
balance requirements. In 1996, President Clinton’s OLC expressed the opinion that the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, which purported to disqualify
certain candidates from appointment as U.S. Trade Representative, was an
unconstitutional intrusion on the President’s appointment power.266 In
doing so, OLC cited its earlier 1979 opinion positing that an appropriate
“balance” allows certain congressional restrictions on presidential nominations.267 OLC argued that a proper analysis depends on the nature of the
office—if the “position in question is especially close to the President,” then
the President must enjoy expansive authority to choose whom he pleases to
serve in the executive office at issue.268
To be sure, OLC’s opinions reflect the fact that Presidents have not been
unanimous in their understanding of the appointment power. However, the
point remains that OLC has never accepted any and all congressional
encroachments on the President’s appointment power. For example, a
report by the Congressional Research Service acknowledges that OLC’s position has changed over time, but nevertheless concludes that, taken as whole,
“they clearly do not endorse the view that [the authority of Congress to set
qualifications for office] is broad.”269 The OLC’s formal opinions on the
President’s constitutional appointments authority demonstrate that the executive branch has not simply acquiesced in congressional efforts to shape or
control the appointments process—including partisan balance
requirements.270
In sum, many factors have driven Congress’s use of partisan balance
requirements from the 1880s to the present day: a desired focus on expertise
above partisanship; an effort to form a bipartisan solution to difficult policy
264 Id. at 250.
265 See supra text accompanying notes 222–24.
266 Constitutionality of Statute Governing Appointment of U.S. Trade Rep., 20 Op.
O.L.C. 279, 279 (1996).
267 Id. at 280.
268 Id.
269 HOGUE, supra note 172, at 7.
270 Compare 138 CONG. REC. 8690 (1992) (statement of Sen. Mitchell (D-ME)) (arguing
the congressionalist position that statutorily imposed qualifications for executive offices are
constitutional and observing that partisan balance requirements “may be found from near
the beginning to near the end of the 50 titles of the United States Code”), with Myers v.
United States, 272 U.S. 52, 171 (1926) (“When instances which actually involve the question are rare . . . the weight of the mere presence of acts on the statute book for a considerable time, as showing general acquiescence in the legislative assertion of a questioned
power, is minimized.”).
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issues; and a desire to foster a sense of legitimacy in the agency’s actions in
the public’s eye. A less benign motive appears to be the desire of Congress to
have significant input on the selection of principal officers within the executive branch.
Whatever its original motivations and justifications, however, the contemporary Congress plainly claims a general power to impose partisan balance requirements on any and all independent federal agencies and is
inclined to jealously guard this prerogative. Congress does so without any
regard to the effects that this historical practice has played, and continues to
play, on the power of the chief executive to faithfully execute the laws. Moreover, when the chief executive does speak out, Congress has demonstrated
that it is willing to defend vigorously against challenges to its power to mandate partisan balance requirements.
III.

THE LEGAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF PARTISAN BALANCE
REQUIREMENTS FOR PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS TO
INDEPENDENT FEDERAL AGENCIES

This Part focuses on the statutory partisan balance requirements that
currently encumber Presidents when selecting principal officers to staff socalled independent federal regulatory agencies. We argue that partisan balance requirements, although superficially attractive, have serious detrimental
consequences for effective presidential control of independent agencies.
Not only are these statutory impediments arguably unconstitutional on separation of powers grounds, but, from a practical (functionalist) perspective,
they also work to undermine presidential control of the executive branch.
Independent agencies are already highly insulated from direct presidential
control by virtue of the fact that their heads enjoy fixed terms of office and
protection from presidential removal absent good cause shown (with judicial
review available for any such good cause removals).271
Any further attenuation of presidential control arguably constitutes a
constitutionally undue burden on the President’s ability to faithfully execute
the laws of the United States.272 As Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. noted
in his majority opinion in Free Enterprise Fund, “[t]he Constitution requires
that a President chosen by the entire Nation oversee the execution of the
laws.”273 When partisan balance requirements are conjoined with fixed
terms of office and good cause removal, a plausible case exists, at least
post–Free Enterprise Fund, that the President’s effective control over these
271 Geoffrey P. Miller, Introduction: The Debate over Independent Agencies in Light of Empirical Evidence, 1988 DUKE L.J. 215, 218.
272 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (providing that the President “shall take Care that the Laws
be faithfully executed”); see also Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd.,
561 U.S. 477, 495–96, 498–502, 513–14 (2010) (holding that the Vesting and Faithful Execution Clauses require the President to enjoy sufficient power to oversee federal administrative agencies to ensure that political responsibility and accountability for such entities
remains with the President).
273 Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 499.
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independent federal agencies within the executive branch has been
unduly—and unconstitutionally—attenuated.274
This Part begins with a general overview of the current appointment process for independent agencies. It proceeds with an outline of how statutory
partisan balance requirements clearly infringe upon the President’s ability to
direct and supervise independent federal agencies. Finally, this Part concludes by contrasting the increased level of control that could be available to
the President in the absence of statutory requirements to make mandatory
bipartisan appointments to independent federal agencies—even where such
principal officers enjoy fixed terms of office and are also protected by a good
cause limitation on the President’s removal power.
A.

The Appointment Process

The appointment process for heads of independent agencies is long and
arduous;275 the inclusion of statutory partisan balance requirements simply
further lengthens the time required for appointments to independent federal agencies.276 These statutory mandates usually limit the President in one
of two ways. For some independent agencies, the agency’s organic act permits the President to appoint only a bare majority of officials from the same
political party to a particular board, commission, or agency.277 For example,
only three of the five commissioners heading the SEC may belong to the
same political party.278 Sometimes, however, Congress precludes the President from appointing even a simple majority of officials from the same political party to the head of independent agencies.279 In either case, the
274 See infra notes 359–63 and accompanying text.
275 See David J. Barron, From Takeover to Merger: Reforming Administrative Law in an Age of
Agency Politicization, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1095, 1096 (2008); Developments in the Law: Presidential Authority, 125 HARV. L. REV. 2057, 2135–37, 2145–46 (2012); Gary E. Hollibaugh, Jr.,
Naı̈ve Cronyism and Neutral Competence: Patronage, Performance, and Policy Agreement in Executive Appointments, J. PUB. ADMIN RES. & THEORY (forthcoming) (manuscript at 25–26), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2405163; see also Anderson P.
Heston, The Flip Side of Removal: Bringing Appointment into the Removal Conversation, 68 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 85, 87, 116 (2012) (blaming the Senate’s use of “hearings, floor votes,
filibusters, and holds—to hinder the President’s appointments”); Thomas O. McGarity,
Administrative Law as Blood Sport: Policy Erosion in a Highly Partisan Age, 61 DUKE L.J. 1671,
1714–16 (2012) (noting one instance in which the President’s nominee withdrew because
of opposition from a minority of senators).
276 Datla & Revesz, supra note 2, at 797–99; Devins & Lewis, supra note 3, at 473–74;
David C. Nixon, Appointment Delay for Vacancies on the Federal Communications Commission, 61
PUB. ADMIN. REV. 483, 488 (2001); David C. Nixon & Roisin M. Bentley, Appointment Delay
and the Policy Environment of the National Transportation Safety Board, 37 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 679,
689 (2006).
277 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2053 (2012) (noting that no more than three of the five commissioners to oversee the Consumer Product Safety Commission can be from the same
political party).
278 15 U.S.C. § 78d.
279 See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(1). Nothing in the enabling statutes explicitly requires
that the President appoint only Democrats and Republicans to these positions. Rather, the
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President must appoint a number of officials from an opposing political party
to positions of strength within the executive branch—whether or not she
wishes to do so.280
The Federal Elections Commission (FEC) provides a telling example of
the potential difficulties that can arise from a statutory partisan balance
requirement that mandates an exactly even partisan balance. The FEC’s enabling statute mandates that the President appoint no more than three of the
six commissioners from the same political party.
Professor Jamin Raskin aptly describes the appointment process for the
FEC as one in which “the majority and minority party leaders in both chambers of Congress take turns sending to the President the names of candidates
that they want appointed to the FEC.”281 Raskin points to President Clinton’s nomination of Bradley Smith as an example of just how constrained
Presidents are in the nomination process.282 When faced with criticism for
selecting Smith, President Clinton actually “protested that he tried to convince Senator Lott to choose another candidate but was unable to do so.”283
In fact, multiple high-ranking members of the executive branch lamented
their inability to reject Smith as a nominee.284 As Smith’s nomination demonstrates, even when a President actually possesses sufficient autonomy to
name a particular nominee, Congress may still wield its confirmation power
so as to ensure that the candidates it wishes to be appointed are actually
appointed.285
As a matter of constitutional text,286 under Article II the President
should enjoy the freedom to nominate principal officers within the executive
branch whom she believes will be most conducive to the successful completion of the agency’s mission. Article II does not permit Congress to aggranstatutes mandate that no more than half the members of a commission, board, or committee belong to the same political party. Because, since the 1860s, only two political parties
have controlled the White House or a chamber of Congress, this requirement almost inevitably results in an even number of Democrats and Republicans being appointed to office.
That said, however, the President has appointed political independents to federal independent agencies from time to time. See Daniel E. Ho, Congressional Agency Control: The
Impact of Statutory Partisan Requirements on Regulation 2, 10 (Feb. 12, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://dho.stanford.edu/research/partisan.pdf.
280 See DAVID E. LEWIS, PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF AGENCY DESIGN: POLITICAL INSULATION IN UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY, 1946–1997, at 167 (2003) (“In the
modern period it has become increasingly important to control the administrative state to
secure public policy outputs.”).
281 Jamin B. Raskin, “A Complicated and Indirect Encroachment”: Is the Federal Election Commission Unconstitutionally Composed?, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 609, 615 (2000).
282 Id. at 615–16.
283 Id. at 616.
284 Id. at 618 n.36.
285 See, e.g., Devins & Lewis, supra note 3, at 473–74. Devins and Lewis note that “at the
end of 2007, none of the commissioners on the Federal Election Commission had been
confirmed for a regular term.” Id. at 473. Instead, “[t]hree were serving under recess
appointments, two others were serving in expired terms, and a sixth slot was vacant.” Id.
286 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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dize itself by dictating the persons whom the President will appoint to
principal offices within the executive branch. The argument could be made
that nothing in the Constitution expressly prohibits the adoption of
mandatory partisan balance requirements, but the logic of this position
proves too much. For, if Congress constitutionally may prescribe the partisan
composition of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC),287 by parity of logic it could in theory prescribe partisan balance within the President’s
cabinet too.
To be sure, a functionalist argument could be made that partisan balance requirements should be judged under a fact-sensitive cost-benefit
calculus. One might permit mandatory partisan balance requirements for
the FTC,288 but not for the Department of State or the Department of
Defense. The analysis would consider the nature and scope of the agency’s
powers, its relationship to “core” executive branch powers, the remaining
degree of presidential control and oversight, and the like.289
From a formalist perspective, questions of degree or scope are not relevant to enforcing the separation of powers doctrine;290 instead, one asks
whether a congressional limitation either usurps or denies a power vested in
the Presidency.291 A formalist analysis, as noted earlier,292 would posit that
restricting the President’s ability to select principal officers based on partisan
affiliation, in conjunction with fixed terms of office and limitations on presidential removal during the term of office, constitute a bridge too far and
unduly circumscribe the President’s power and duties under Article II’s Vesting and Faithful Execution Clauses.
It should not be particularly surprising that, all things being equal, Presidents tend to seek out persons who support their policy agendas when nam287 47 U.S.C. § 154 (2012).
288 15 U.S.C. § 41.
289 See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 857 (1986)
(“[B]right-line rules cannot effectively be employed to yield broad principles applicable in
all Article III inquiries. Rather, due regard must be given in each case to the unique
aspects of the congressional plan at issue and its practical consequences in light of the
larger concerns that underlie Article III.” (citation omitted)).
290 See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2600–01 (2011) (finding that Bankruptcy
Court judges unconstitutionally exercise Article III judicial power by engaging in factfinding in common law claims related to bankruptcy proceedings despite such Article I judges
lacking the constitutional attributes of Article III judges, notably including salary protection and lifetime appointments); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd.,
561 U.S. 477, 484 (2010) (finding a system of multilevel good cause removal protection for
PCAOB members unconstitutional because it unduly attenuates the President’s ability to
oversee the enforcement of federal law and thereby unduly insulates the President from
responsibility, and political accountability, for the Board’s actions); New Process Steel, L.P.
v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674, 676 (2010) (holding that the NLRB’s organic act specifically
requires three members to constitute a quorum and also holding that two members could
not exercise delegated authority from a three-member NLRB that no longer exists).
291 Magill, supra note 94, at 608–09; see Krotoszynski, supra note 30, at 1611–13.
292 See supra notes 290–91 and accompanying text.
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ing principal officers to independent federal agencies.293 Although past
Presidents have emphasized the relevant policy expertise of candidates,
recent Presidents have focused on finding nominees whose ideology aligns
with the President.294 Consequently, the vetting process now consists of
examining the “policy preferences of candidates.”295 In fact, to demonstrate
their political qualifications for a position, some past agency heads have actually “file[d] separate statements . . . so that Democrats and Republicans could
establish their ‘reputations for loyalty.’ ”296
One should also take care to distinguish partisan balance requirements
from objective qualifications for office that relate to education, training, or
prior relevant work experience. For example, requiring that a particular
senior office holder within the Nuclear Regulatory Commission hold a graduate degree in nuclear physics does not require the President to entrust the
execution of the law to a political opponent; presumably there are both Democrats and Republicans holding advanced degrees in nuclear physics.
Requiring the President to select someone competent to perform a particular
task can be easily distinguished from efforts to prevent the President from
enjoying effective control over the various agencies, boards, commissions,
and departments that comprise the executive branch of the federal
government.
Thus, a pragmatic formalist can readily accept the proposition that Congress constitutionally may establish by statute objective qualifications, related
to the competence of the appointee, without transgressing the separation of
powers. However, partisan affiliation simply is not an objective professional
qualification. It constitutes a political, or perhaps even ideological, requirement for holding a particular office. It is one thing for Congress to require
that an appointee be objectively qualified to perform a particular task or
function; it is quite another to force the President to staff principal offices
within the executive branch with her political opponents.
Moreover, statutory partisan balance requirements converge with the
structure of independent federal agencies to significantly impact the appointment process. So-called independent agencies usually are headed by com293 Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design,
89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 45–46 (2010) (“Given the modern vetting process and party partisanship that produces extreme party loyalty, presidents typically can predict with great accuracy how an appointee will decide issues of importance to the Administration.”).
294 Devins & Lewis, supra note 3, at 481–82; see Barron, supra note 275, at 1129; William
E. Brigman, The Executive Branch and the Independent Regulatory Agencies, 11 PRESIDENTIAL
STUD. Q. 244, 246 (1981); Heston, supra note 275, at 121; Nixon, supra note 276, at 486;
Nixon & Bentley, supra note 276, at 682; B. Dan Wood, Does Politics Make a Difference at the
EEOC?, 34 AM. J. POL. SCI. 503, 508 (1990).
295 Nixon & Bentley, supra note 276, at 684; see Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration,
114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2277 (2001).
296 Devins & Lewis, supra note 3, at 494 (quoting Keith S. Brown & Adam Candeub,
Ideology Versus Partisanship: Regulatory Behavior and Cyclical Political Influence 10 (MSU Legal
Stud. Res. Paper Series, Paper No. 04-10, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=913806).
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missioners with staggered terms, thus ensuring that every seat on an agency is
not open at the same time.297 This design also increases the amount of time
required before a President can appoint a majority to an agency, if she is able
to appoint a majority at all.298 Because of statutory partisan balance requirements for members, the President’s first appointment to a particular entity
might have to hail from her political opposition, rather than from her own
political party. For example, if an agency is headed by a board or commission which already has the maximum number of members from the President’s political party, the incoming President will be forced to appoint a
member from the opposing political party. Presidents tend to appoint
agency heads from their own party to the longest available terms, thereby
ensuring that the appointee’s term continues during the incumbent President’s term.299
Unless an incumbent member of an independent federal agency decides
to step down or the President has a legally valid basis for removal, the President is powerless to fire the official regardless of whether the incumbent
enjoys the President’s confidence.300 As Justice George Sutherland
explained in Humphrey’s Executor, “[w]e think it plain under the Constitution
that illimitable power of removal is not possessed by the President in respect
of officers of the character of those just named”301 and Congress’s power to
limit the President’s removal power over agencies vested with quasi-legislative
and quasi-judicial powers, such as the FTC, “cannot well be doubted.”302
This power “includes, as an appropriate incident, power to fix the period
during which they shall continue in office, and to forbid their removal except
for cause in the meantime.”303
In some cases, however, a President’s first appointment may be from his
own party.304 As stated above, the agency heads with the longest terms are
usually from the same political party as the preceding President.305 If the
preceding President was from the political party opposing the incoming President, the incoming President must then successfully navigate the lengthy
297 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2012) (establishing fixed terms of office for SEC
commissioners).
298 Terry M. Moe, Regulatory Performance and Presidential Administration, 26 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 197, 198 (1982).
299 Devins & Lewis, supra note 3, at 471.
300 Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629–32 (1935); see Steven G. Calabresi et al., The Rise and Fall of the Separation of Powers, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 527, 540 n.57
(2012).
301 Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 629.
302 Id.
303 Id.
304 Devins & Lewis, supra note 3, at 471 (“[A]fter a party change in the White House . . .
Presidents leaving office usually select their own partisans for the appointments that will
last longest into the new administration. This means that the staggered terms that expire
first after a party change are systematically more likely to be from the new President’s own
party.”).
305 Id.
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Senate confirmation process to achieve any semblance of working control
over the agency.306 Even when multiple seats on an agency are open, the
President’s appointment power is further circumscribed by the Senate practice of “batching.”307 That is, senators from the President’s opposition will
agree to confirm the President’s nominees only if she also appoints a nominee of their choosing.308 Consequently, Presidents can be enmeshed in
negotiations for a lengthy period of time to secure the appointment and confirmation of the officials who will assist them in carrying out their constitutional duties309—including their duty to ensure that federal laws are
faithfully executed.310
Not only has the time for appointing an agency head increased,311 but,
in addition, Presidents have faced the prospect of working with agencies
headed entirely by commissioners from an opposing political party, a prior
administration of her own party, or both.312 Meanwhile, the agency could be
either incapable of functioning due to an insufficient number of appointed
commissioners,313 under the control of commissioners from the political
party opposing the President, or headed by past commissioners from the
same political party as the President but not chosen by the President.314
306 Id. at 470–71.
307 Id. at 489.
308 Id.; Keith S. Brown & Adam Candeub, Partisans & Partisan Commissions, 17 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 789, 805–06 (2010) (noting the prevalence of batching in the nomination
process for FCC commissioners).
309 Heston, supra note 275, at 117.
310 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
311 Devins & Lewis, supra note 3, at 472–75.
312 Id. at 470–71.
313 See New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674, 679–80, 687–88 (2010). In New
Process Steel, the Supreme Court invalidated an effort by a three-member NLRB to delegate
adjudicative power to the two remaining board members who remained in office after the
third member’s term expired. Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the majority,
explained that “the Board quorum requirement and the three-member delegation clause
[contained in the NLRB’s organic act] should not be read as easily surmounted technical
obstacles of little to no import.” Id. at 687.
314 Devins & Lewis, supra note 3, at 471, 473 & n.61; Heston, supra note 275, at 118–19;
see Datla & Revesz, supra note 2, at 789–92 (discussing the effects of fixed terms of office
for members of agency heads on presidential control); McGarity, supra note 275, at
1714–16 (noting that “[i]n one instance, Senator Shelby and forty-four other Republican
senators, with the strong backing of the banking industry, refused to confirm any nominee
to head the new [Consumer Financial Protection Bureau] until the president had agreed
to replace the director of the agency with a five-member board composed of both Republicans and Democrats,” and suggesting that “[b]ecause the CFPB could not promulgate any
regulations until it had a full-time director, it was effectively prevented from implementing
the consumer-protection provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act”); Wenmouth Williams, Jr.,
Impact of Commissioner Background on FCC Decisions: 1962–1975, 20 J. BROAD. 239, 251 (1976)
(noting that President Nixon had to “contend with liberal hold-overs”). Professor
McGarity observes, in the context of the CFPB, that “[i]n essence, a single senator was
nearly able to repeal the new statute, and he successfully put it on hold for a year and a
half.” McGarity, supra note 275, at 1716.
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Regardless of which situation exists, the President has been effectively precluded from asserting meaningful control over the agency. This result is particularly unacceptable considering that these agencies are within the
executive branch, which Article II mandates must be under the effective control of the President.315
Regulated entities have attempted to challenge these partisan balance
requirements, albeit unsuccessfully. For instance, in National Committee of the
Reform Party of United States v. Democratic National Committee, the plaintiffs challenged partisan balance restrictions applicable to the FEC.316 Rather than
reach the merits of the issue, however, the court dismissed the action on
standing grounds, holding that the plaintiffs had not suffered a legally cognizable injury in fact.317 Likewise, a similar challenge was brought unsuccessfully against the FEC in Federal Election Commission v. NRA Political Victory
Fund.318 Strikingly, the court thought partisan balance requirements were
not a significant impediment to Presidents.319 The court appeared to be
swayed, at least in part, by the extensive de facto influence Congress already
has in the appointment process through the Senate’s confirmation power.320
Ultimately, the court found that there was nothing to suggest “that the bipartisanship requirement has any effect on the Commission’s work, for without
the statute the President could have appointed exactly the same
members.”321
This reasoning strikes us as very strange. To say that the President could
have appointed the same persons in the absence of the partisan balance
requirement is not at all the same thing as saying that the President would, in
fact, have appointed the same persons to the FEC. In fact, this logic would
support any and all congressional limits on the President’s appointments to
executive branch offices. After all, it is always possible that the President
might have appointed the same person in the absence of a statutory mandate
to select a person from the opposition party. Could Congress require that
the President name her defeated principal opponent—either primary or
general election—as the Secretary of State? And would such a limitation be
constitutional because the President could have named this person in the
315 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (providing that “[t]he executive Power shall be
vested in a President of the United States”); id. art. II, § 3 (providing that the President
“shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”); see also Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co.
Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 498–502 (2010) (holding that the Vesting and
Faithful Execution Clauses together require that the President enjoy meaningful supervisory control over entities within the executive branch of the federal government).
316 168 F.3d 360, 365 (9th Cir. 1999).
317 Id.
318 6 F.3d 821, 823–24 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
319 Id. at 824 (“Appellants do not argue, nor can we assume, that the President wished
to appoint more than three members of one party and was restrained by FECA from doing
so.”).
320 See id. at 825.
321 Id.
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absence of the statutory requirement? We think that the answer to this question should be obvious, and easy, to any reasonable person (i.e., “no”).
B.

The Important Real World Effects of Statutory Partisan Balance Requirements
on the Deliberative Dynamics of Independent Federal Agencies

Although statutory partisan balance requirements may appear innocuous or even beneficial at first glance, these provisions have far-reaching
ramifications on the President’s ability to properly influence and oversee
independent federal agencies.322 Numerous scholarly commentators have
analyzed the effect of partisan limitations.323 Although none of the studies
examine every independent agency, even a cursory consideration of this
important academic work will establish that statutory partisan balance
requirements have a powerful impact on the day-to-day functioning of independent federal agencies.324 This Section considers the findings from these
empirical studies and will demonstrate how partisan balance requirements
significantly erode effective presidential control over independent agencies.
If a two-tiered system of good cause removal transgresses the separation of
powers doctrine, as the Free Enterprise Fund majority held, a strong argument
exists that mandatory partisan balance requirements should also be deemed
to unduly attenuate presidential oversight and control of independent federal agencies.
1.

The Problem of Compromised Agency Decisionmaking

Statutory partisan balance requirements quite literally force Presidents
to rely on political enemies to carry out their executive duties. In so doing,
these provisions splinter the unitary executive.325 Professor Daniel Ho conducted a study of the FCC in which he found that “partisan requirements
may have considerable effects on substantive policy outcomes.”326 In fact,
multiple studies show that a commissioner’s party affiliation is a reliable indicator of how the commissioner is likely to vote on policy issues.327 This is
322 See infra subsection III.B.2.
323 See infra subsection III.B.2.
324 See infra subsection III.B.3.
325 LEWIS, supra note 280, at 48.
326 Ho, supra note 279, at 1. Professor Ho’s study is limited in scope because it only
examines the FCC; on the other hand, however, it analyzes the agency’s decisions over a
period of forty years. In certain areas, he expands his discussion to include other agencies.
Id. at 9; see Hollibaugh, supra note 275, at 22 (suggesting that political affiliation can affect
independent agency operations and actions). But cf. Williams, supra note 314, at 241
(“However, party affiliation has not been a reliable predictor of voting on the
Commission.”).
327 Barkow, supra note 293, at 20 n.15; Bradley C. Canon, Voting Behavior on the FCC, 13
MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 587, 609 (1969); Brown & Candeub, supra note 296, at 2; William T.
Gormley Jr., A Test of the Revolving Door Hypothesis at the FCC, 23 AM. J. POL. SCI. 665, 675–76
(1979); Ho, supra note 279, at 4; Stuart Nagel & Martin Lubin, Regulatory Commissioners and
Party Politics, 17 ADMIN. L. REV. 39, 41 (1964).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-3\NDL301.txt

992

unknown

Seq: 52

notre dame law review

2-MAR-15

14:12

[vol. 90:3

especially troubling considering the increased polarization present in American political parties.328 According to Professor Ho, empirical evidence belies
“the notion that expertise exclusively drives decisionmaking.”329 Partisanship also correlates with the probability of whether a commissioner will agree
with the agency chair.330 For instance, Professors Keith Brown and Adam
Candeub found that “when a commissioner belongs to the chair’s party, the
commissioner is more likely to affirm and less likely to dissent.”331 Essentially, statutory partisan balance requirements foster a politically polarizing
environment at the heads of independent agencies.
The idea behind partisan balance requirements is that the presence of
opposition party members will lead to a greater spirit of compromise and
collaborative decisionmaking. Perhaps in an ideal world, this would be so.
However, in the real world in which we actually live, instead of enhancing the
quality of agency deliberations, these statutory partisan balance requirements
force Presidents to carry out their executive duties with contentious and
highly polarized agency heads.
It also bears noting that these are principal officers, not inferior officers
or mere employees.332 Instead of bringing an added level of expertise to the
executive branch, these agencies have become yet another arena of political
contention in an already highly contentious environment. Statutory partisan
balance requirements preclude a President from appointing a sufficient
number of agency commissioners in agreement with her political philosophy
to overcome the debilitating effect of partisanship.
Although some legal scholars doubt whether partisan balance requirements for independent federal agencies actually affect the operation of these
executive branch entities,333 they generally have not provided convincing evidence in support of this (contestable) position.334 For example, some scholars contend that party affiliation is largely irrelevant because there are so few
328 Devins & Lewis, supra note 3, at 477 (“Not only has the average Republican become
more conservative and the average Democrat more liberal, but the divergence of views
within the parties has also lessened.”).
329 Ho, supra note 279, at 4.
330 Brown & Candeub, supra note 308, at 797–99.
331 Id. at 797. The authors actually suggest that the chair’s party affiliation is more
influential than the party affiliation of the commissioners. Id. at 799. Regardless of how
much impact the chair may have, the party affiliations of commissioners has a determining
role in agency decisionmaking.
332 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 512–13
(2010) (“As a constitutional matter, we see no reason why a multimember body may not be
the ‘Hea[d]’ of a ‘Departmen[t]’ that it governs.” (alterations in original)); Edmond v.
United States, 520 U.S. 651, 662–63 (1997) (distinguishing principal and inferior executive
branch officers based on the scope of their discretionary power and observing that “we
think it evident that ‘inferior officers’ are officers whose work is directed and supervised at
some level by others who were appointed by presidential nomination with the advice and
consent of the Senate”).
333 Brigman, supra note 294, at 251.
334 See, e.g., Brown & Candeub, supra note 308, at 790.
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dissents by agency heads.335 However, this premise fails to fully take into
account the effect of partisanship.336 Rather, as Professor Ho observes, there
are a number of points during an agency’s deliberative process where the
political ideologies of the commissioners can shape the agency’s
decisionmaking.337
By focusing solely on the number of dissents, these scholars have
ignored other integral functions of independent agencies. For example,
Professors Susan Snyder and Barry Weingast note that the composition of the
agency’s governing body can influence both the type of cases people choose
to file with the agency and the cases the agency staff allows to go forward
within the agency.338 Accordingly, a modest number of dissents could be the
result of a number of other factors and undervalues the real world effects of
divided agency heads. Even if dissents are not commonplace, a more holistic
view of the political dynamics of federal independent agencies demonstrates
that mandatory partisan balance requirements do in fact have a material
impact on the policymaking function of federal independent agencies.
It also bears noting that the Free Enterprise Fund majority did not require
actual proof of instances in which two-tiered good cause removal restrictions
actually had impeded the President’s ability to oversee and direct the operations of a particular federal agency.339 Instead, the mere fact that such a
high degree of insulation of persons with policymaking authority could affect
the President’s ability to direct the agency’s operations was sufficient to establish a violation of the separation of powers doctrine.340 As Chief Justice Roberts explained, “[i]n its pursuit of a ‘workable government,’ Congress cannot
reduce the Chief Magistrate to a cajoler-in-chief.”341 From a formalist per335 Id. at 805–06.
336 Ho, supra note 279, at 11 (“That said, the low dissent rate on other commissions
suggests that a considerable dimension of agency output may not be captured by focusing
on votes alone.”).
337 Id.
338 Susan K. Snyder & Barry R. Weingast, The American System of Shared Powers: The President, Congress, and the NLRB, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 269, 285 (2000). Professors Snyder and
Weingast explain:
For example, consider a change in board membership that creates more pro[]labor decisions. The unions and businesses that file cases now face new
probabilities of winning their cases. Unions may now file complaints that they
previously thought had too little chance of winning to file. Businesses may file
fewer complaints than they did before. The board staff will take their cue from
the board members’ voting behavior and perhaps allow more cases filed by labor
to go to the board for decisions. The changes in union and business filing behavior and staff filtering decisions, in turn, create a new case mix for board decisions. . . . Thus while the policy preference of the board may have changed in the
pro[-]labor direction, the voting scores may not reflect this change.
Id.
339 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 498–513
(2010).
340 See id. at 498–502.
341 Id. at 502.
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spective, it should not be necessary to prove that the President has already
lost control of an executive branch entity; the risk of such a loss of control is
itself constitutionally problematic.342
2.

The Polarizing Effect of Statutory Partisan Balance Requirements

In addition to influencing agency decisionmaking, statutory partisan balance requirements impede the President’s ability to perform his constitutional duty of overseeing the executive branch. Professor Ho found that
“Republican presidents appear to appoint Democrats who are even more liberal than Democrats appointed by Democratic presidents (and vice
versa).”343 Thus, statutory partisan balance requirements force the President
to contend with agency officials who are not only opposed to his agenda but
vehemently opposed.344 Professors Neal Devins and David Lewis suggest that
this practice stems from appointees—again, who clearly constitute principal
officers within the executive branch345—affiliating themselves with the position most favorable to their political party, which coincidentally places many
of the appointees at odds with the President (and on an ongoing basis).346
Appointing candidates simply to satisfy a statutory partisan balance
requirement further instills a polarizing political divide among the heads of
independent agencies.347 As noted above, some agency heads have structured their behavior so as to wear their political affiliations on their
sleeves.348 Professors Cass Sunstein and Thomas Miles contend that
“[p]erhaps both Republican and Democratic appointees would conceive of
342 See infra notes 388–91 and accompanying text.
343 Ho, supra note 279, at 4, 18, 24–26. Professor Ho places the blame for this result on
the Senate’s involvement with the selection process and oversight of many of these agencies; however, a more plausible culprit is the statutory partisan requirements found in
many of the enabling statutes for these agencies. Without the statutes forcing the President to appoint a certain number of agency members from the opposing party, it is highly
unlikely the President would be forced to select so many appointees who do not align with
his political views. See Nagel & Lubin, supra note 327, at 44.
344 Devins & Lewis, supra note 3, at 461; Ho, supra note 279, at 4. President Carter’s
appointees did not fall within this generalization; however, that is easily explained by his
use of a selection process that deviated from other Presidents. Ho, supra note 279, at 25
n.30.
345 Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2611 (2011); Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S.
651, 662–63 (1997); see Tuan Samahon, Are Bankruptcy Judges Unconstitutional? An Appointments Clause Challenge, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 233, 233, 296 (2008) (discussing the constitutional
concept of principal and inferior officers and the legal tests used to distinguish between
these categories of executive officers).
346 Devins & Lewis, supra note 3, at 490.
347 See Cass R. Sunstein & Thomas J. Miles, Depoliticizing Administrative Law, 58 DUKE L.J.
2193, 2228 (2009) (arguing that formally requiring judicial panels on the federal appellate
courts to include at least one judge appointed by a President of each major party could
have the unfortunate effect of increasing, rather than decreasing, the risk of ideological—
or even partisan—judging).
348 Devins & Lewis, supra note 3, at 494 (citing Brown & Candeub, supra note 296, at
10).
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themselves, to a somewhat greater degree, as political partisans, simply
because the requirement of mixed composition would suggest as much.”349
Essentially, statutory partisan balance requirements have resulted in polarizing entities within the executive branch to such a degree that Presidents face
an increasingly difficult job of mobilizing executive officials to carry out the
President’s policy agenda.350 Of course, real-world political pressure would
compel the President to appoint politically diverse candidates in some circumstances;351 however, the polarizing effect would not be as dramatic as
that created by statutory partisan balance requirements.
3.

Impeding Timely Executive Action

Statutory restrictions on the President’s appointment power further
lengthen an already lengthy confirmation process. The President’s control
over independent agencies becomes further attenuated because of the considerable amount of time required before the President can appoint a majority of her party to the head of the agency.352 Depending on whether the
preceding administration was of the same political party as the current
administration, the temporal delay in securing a majority of commissioners
from the same political party could become even more extended.353 Furthermore, studies show that it takes Presidents twice as long to make crossparty nominations as compared to vacancies without formal partisan balance
requirements,354 and partisan balance restrictions further increase the number of cross-party appointees.355
Some scholars contend that Presidents can overcome this obstacle by
seeking to nominate independents (i.e., persons not affiliated with either the
Democratic or Republican parties) who will follow the President’s instructions.356 This suggestion, however, is impractical because political independents will not always adhere to the President’s policy agenda and do not face
much in the way of partisan consequences if they prove to be faithless to the
349 Sunstein & Miles, supra note 347, at 2228.
350 Some commentators have argued that partisan balance requirements are irrelevant.
In fact, these observers point to multiple instances in which Republican presidents have
appointed Democrats who, rather than vote according to the Democratic ideology and
policy preferences, instead have aligned with Republican members on the agency. Such
episodes have been largely anecdotal, however. Ho, supra note 279, at 2–3, 19 (noting that
some scholars contend that “cross-party commissioners come in sheep’s clothing”).
351 See, e.g., Brigman, supra note 294, at 252 (noting that President Nixon’s appointments to the FCC were heavily influenced by the desires of Republican senators).
352 Devins & Lewis, supra note 3, at 469–70.
353 Id. at 470; Nixon, supra note 276, at 489 (“Vacancies requiring cross-party nomination are predicted to last over twice as long as unrestricted seat vacancies.”).
354 Devins & Lewis, supra note 3, at 470; Nixon, supra note 276, at 489.
355 Ho, supra note 279, at 10–11. Yet, there was one outlier agency—the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The NRC differed from the other agencies, however, because a
number of the commissioners appointed were actually political independents not aligned
with either major party. Id. at 10.
356 Brigman, supra note 294, at 251; Moreno, supra note 129, at 500.
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President who appointed them.357 It also seems quite likely, from a purely
practical perspective, that senators from the opposition party will insist that
members of their party be appointed to any and all minority party seats on
independent federal agencies.358
Consequently, statutory partisan balance requirements have the effect of
increasing the time required for Presidents to assert effective control over
independent federal agencies. This result should be unacceptable if, as
Chief Justice Roberts wrote in Free Enterprise Fund, “[t]he Constitution
requires that a President chosen by the entire Nation oversee the execution
of the laws.”359 The power to appoint is the mirror image of the power to
remove; if undue limitations on the removal power violate the separation of
powers,360 so too should undue restrictions on the appointment power. The
presidential appointment power constitutes one of the President’s primary
means of establishing control over independent federal agencies.361 If an
agency’s structural design precludes the President from appointing a majority of commissioners from her political party, and conjoins this limitation
with fixed terms of office and protection against midterm removal except for
good cause shown, the President’s effective control over the agency in question is, if not nullified, then substantially impeded.
We do not question the validity of the rule established in Humphrey’s
Executor, namely that fixed terms of office and good cause removal limitations
against midterm removal do not violate the separation of powers doctrine.362
357 Ronald Turner, Ideological Voting on the National Labor Relations Board, 8 U. PA. J. LAB.
& EMP. L. 707, 719 (2006). Other scholars suggest that the President’s recess appointment
power can accommodate any strategic delays. See, e.g., Huq, supra note 19, at 28. In light
of NLRB v. Noel Canning, however, the President’s recess appointment power is of questionable utility in overcoming senatorial opposition to her nominees. See NLRB v. Noel
Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2574 (2014). The Supreme Court’s Noel Canning decision has
reduced significantly the President’s ability to use the recess appointment power. The Senate has adopted the routine practice of holding pro forma sessions that keep the body
technically in session, thereby blocking the President from making recess appointments;
Noel Canning has validated this practice as an effective and constitutional means of preventing presidential recess appointments. See id. at 2567 (holding that the recess appointment
power arises only when the Senate goes into recess for at least 10 days); id. at 2574 (holding that the Senate may determine for itself when it is in session); see also supra note 105
(discussing the majority and concurring opinions in Noel Canning).
358 See Devins & Lewis, supra note 3, at 489; Raskin, supra note 281, at 615.
359 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 499 (2010).
360 Id. at 498–502.
361 Moe, supra note 298, at 200 (“For example, while the [P]resident cannot directly
control commission personnel, the chairman and appointed staff nonetheless constitute a
potential core of presidential partisans who are uniquely situated to shape the behavior of
the commissions.”); see Brigman, supra note 294, at 246 (noting the centrality of the
appointments process to presidential oversight); Aulana L. Peters, Independent Agencies:
Government’s Scourge or Salvation?, 1988 DUKE L.J. 286, 287–88 (noting the difficulty of
securing presidential control over independent federal agencies); Wood, supra note 294, at
506 (listing the appointment power as one of the means for presidential control).
362 Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 627–32 (1935); see also Free Enter.
Fund, 561 U.S. at 483 (“Congress can, under certain circumstances, create independent
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But, after Free Enterprise Fund, the constitutional analysis cannot simply consider partisan balance requirements in isolation from other limitations on
presidential control over independent agencies; Free Enterprise Fund teaches
that statutory devices that impede the President’s ability to direct and oversee
a federal independent agency must be considered in conjunction. When
considered together, partisan balance requirements greatly exacerbate the
independence-enhancing effects of fixed terms of office and limitations on
removal. Quite plainly, the cumulative effect, or whole, of these devices is
greater than the sum of the parts. To force the President to staff principal
offices within federal agencies with political opponents is to attenuate, if not
prevent, effective presidential control and oversight.363
4.

So-Called “Turncoat” Appointees to Independent Federal Agencies

Yet another troubling aspect of statutory partisan balance requirements
is the possibility that one of the President’s appointees proves to be a “turncoat,” that is, the nominee purporting to be a supporter of the President’s
policy agenda turns out to be an opponent of it. Although this problem has
not been pervasive, it has occurred and presents troubling dilemmas. President John F. Kennedy once appointed a Democratic nominee to the FCC
who, although nominally a Democrat, “rarely voted with the other Democrats
appointed by Kennedy.”364 Considering the already limited control Presidents have over independent agencies because of the statutory limits on the
President’s removal power, appointing a “turncoat” can be highly detrimental to the President’s ability to ensure faithful execution of the laws. Because
of the restricted openings available for members of the President’s political
party, appointing a “turncoat” essentially cedes control of an agency to a President’s political opponents—and because of the fixed terms of office associated with independent agency appointments, this circumstance could
continue for an extended period of time.
In such circumstances, the President would be forced to wait for an
opportunity to correct her error by making a new (and better) appointment,
or to attempt to convince members from the opposition party to support her
policy agenda for the agency. Of course, the probability of a President successfully recruiting an opposition party appointee to support her agenda is
agencies run by principal officers appointed by the President, whom the President may not
remove at will but only for good cause.”); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691–92 (1988)
(“[W]e cannot say that the imposition of a ‘good cause’ standard for removal by itself
unduly trammels on executive authority. . . .Nor do we think that the ‘good cause’ removal
provision at issue here impermissibly burdens the President’s power to control or supervise
the independent counsel, as an executive official, in the execution of his or her duties
under the Act.”).
363 Cf. Strauss, supra note 13, at 596–97, 649–50 (arguing that presidential control of
administrative agencies constitutes an essential and constitutionally mandatory counterweight to the influence of Congress over such entities).
364 Williams, supra note 314, at 241, 247 (noting that this appointee often voted with
Republican commissioners).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-3\NDL301.txt

998

unknown

Seq: 58

notre dame law review

2-MAR-15

14:12

[vol. 90:3

quite low precisely because the statutory partisan balance requirements have
contributed to the further polarization of the members of independent federal agencies.365
5.

Enhanced Congressional Influence on Independent Executive Branch
Agencies

In addition to reducing presidential control over independent agencies,
statutory partisan balance requirements render independent agencies more
susceptible to congressional influence—if not de facto control. Studies suggest that insulated agencies, such as those with statutory partisan balance
requirements, are prone to performing their duties according to Congress’s
wishes (rather than the President’s policy preferences).366 More specifically,
Professor David Lewis reasons that “political insulation [serves] to decrease
the impact of changing administrations.”367 Because an agency’s relationship with Congress is ongoing, and because members of Congress tend to be
reelected, committees of jurisdiction could easily have longer standing relationships with the members of independent agencies than a new presidential
administration. And, these relationships invest members of Congress with
significant influence over these independent federal agencies.368
In fact, Congress is more likely to create independent agencies when
Congress perceives the administration to be weak.369 Although the Constitution contemplates a system of checks and balances in the federal government, mandatory partisan balance requirements clearly create significant
tension with the unitary executive created in Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution. Congressional influence over independent federal agencies merely
starts, but does not finish, with the appointments process itself.370
Furthermore, Presidents are often powerless to remedy this imbalance in
effective influence vis-à-vis Congress. Studies demonstrate that agencies with
statutory bipartisan requirements are more durable than agencies without
365 See supra notes 343–46 and accompanying text.
366 David E. Lewis, The Adverse Consequences of the Politics of Agency Design for Presidential
Management in the United States: The Relative Durability of Insulated Agencies, 34 BRIT. J. POL.
SCI. 377, 379, 383 (2004).
367 LEWIS, supra note 280, at 143.
368 See Strauss, supra note 13, at 592. Professor Strauss explains that
budgetary controls, investigations, hearings, and all the general apparatus of congressional oversight are brought to bear across the board. As has often enough
been noted, these relationships can be particularly important; congressmen and
committee staffs tend to be longer-lived than Presidents and their appointees,
and through hearings and budgetary actions can work much mischief.
Id.
369 Id. at 546–49; see Barkow, supra note 293, at 25 (“[For] agencies created between
1947 and 1990 . . . Congress used independent agencies more often during periods of
divided government than unified government, a result consistent with the idea that Congress uses independent agencies at least in part to keep power away from a President of the
opposite party.” (footnote omitted)).
370 See Devins & Lewis, supra note 3, at 489; Raskin, supra note 281, at 615.
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those requirements.371 That is, these agencies are less likely to be terminated
or to undergo significant reorganization.372 In fact, “[a]gencies with party
balancing limitations are more than twice as likely to survive fifty years.”373
As Professor David Lewis has aptly observed, Presidents face a dilemma of
“presid[ing] over an unmanageable bureaucracy, a population of unresponsive immortals.”374 In sum, even if a President wished to bring an unresponsive agency to book, she would likely be unable to do so.
C.

Independent Federal Agencies Can Exist Without
Imposing Partisan Constraints

Presidents have considerably greater freedom when working with independent agencies if they are not constrained by statutory partisan balance
requirements.375 In such cases, the President is legally free to choose her
first choice for the position (regardless of the person’s partisan affiliation).
A statute that vests an agency member with a fixed term of office and good
cause removal protection ensures independence, but does not force the President to name her political opponents to principal federal offices within the
executive branch.
By definition, mandatory partisan balance requirements will increase the
number of cross-party appointees serving on independent federal agencies.
However, such statutory requirements achieve this only through a direct and
proportional loss of presidential control and oversight.376 Mandatory partisan balance requirements compel Presidents to appoint more cross-party
agency members than they might otherwise;377 considering the significant
influence of partisanship,378 the addition of even a single independent
371 Lewis, supra note 366, at 379, 396.
372 Id. at 387.
373 Id. at 397. In addition, “[t]he hazard rate for agencies that have party limitations on
appointments is 63 percent lower than other agencies.” LEWIS, supra note 280, at 154.
374 Lewis, supra note 366, at 379; see also LEWIS, supra note 280, at 164 (“The bureaucracy becomes less amenable to presidential coordination and management.”).
375 Lewis, supra note 366, at 400 (“In insulated agencies the impact of changing administrations is muted so that policies have less variance and the variance occurs around an
ideal point set by the enacting Congress or the current Congress.”).
376 Ho, supra note 279, at 3–4, 35; see also Barkow, supra note 293, at 40 (noting that
political pressures still force the President to appoint agency heads from the opposing
political party). This finding should not come as a surprise considering the degree to
which the federal government has become polarized politically. See Devins & Lewis, supra
note 3, at 489–91.
377 Ho, supra note 279, at 10–11 (“[P]residents virtually never appoint . . . more crossparty appointments than statutorily required to commissions with partisan
requirements.”).
378 Devins & Lewis, supra note 3, at 489–90 (noting that senators delay confirming presidential selections to nonagency positions to force the President to appoint commissions
from the opposing political party); see also Joshua Kershner, Political Party Restrictions and
the Appointments Clause: The Federal Election Commission’s Appointments Process Is Constitutional,
32 CARDOZO L. REV. 615, 649–50 (2010) (discussing the extensive congressional influence
over presidential appointments to the Federal Election Commission (FEC)).
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agency member with views opposing the President could prove highly detrimental to a President’s ability to fulfill her constitutional duties under Article
II.
We believe that it is entirely possible to achieve a significant level of
agency independence without requiring the President to appoint her political opponents to principal offices within the executive branch. Fixed terms
of office, coupled with good cause removal provisions, provide significant
protection against direct forms of political control by the President without
denying the President the ability to work with persons who hope to see the
administration succeed at the task of governing. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) provides an excellent example of an agency that performs with a significant measure of independence, but without a formal
partisan balance requirement.379
Professor Joan Flynn has found that, except for one “bizarre phenomenon,” Presidents appointing officials to the NLRB have only appointed those
persons who align with their political and ideological views.380 Furthermore,
there have been clear shifts in NLRB rulings, which correlate to the political
composition of the board.381 In a democracy, where elections are supposed
to have consequences, this should be seen as a virtue, not a defect.382
In a study of the NLRB’s performance, Professor Terry Moe found that
“the labor-management balance . . . exhibit[s] a pattern of shifts across
administrations.”383 In fact, the appointing President has been able to
379 Moe, supra note 298, at 197–98.
380 Joan Flynn, A Quiet Revolution at the Labor Board: The Transformation of the NLRB,
1935–2000, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361, 1412–13 (2000) (“During the earlier period, Board
member voting was extremely closely correlated with the political party of the appointing
President . . . . And as for the appointment of partisans, while Republicans Eisenhower,
Nixon, and Ford put a number of management lawyers or representatives on the Board,
they most certainly did not appoint any union lawyers, nor did the Democratic Presidents
appoint any management lawyers.”).
381 Turner, supra note 357, at 720 (“Board policy [regarding employer threats to close
plants] has seesawed along with the occupants of the White House and their Board appointees.”); see Brigman, supra note 294, at 245; William N. Cooke & Frederick H. Gautschi III,
Political Bias in NLRB Unfair Labor Practice Decisions, 35 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 539, 546
(1982); William N. Cooke et al., The Determinants of NLRB Decision-Making Revisited, 48
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 237, 242 (1995); Moe, supra note 298, at 208.
382 But see LEWIS, supra note 280, at 154–67 (noting the high degree of functional independence from the President that some federal agencies enjoy and questioning the wisdom of permitting agency members and staff to disregard the President’s policy agenda);
Lewis, supra note 366, at 379–97 (discussing the problem of independent agencies proving
largely indifferent to presidential policy preferences and constituting a kind of cadre of
“unresponsive immortals”).
383 Moe, supra note 298, at 211–13. Although Professor Moe’s study was limited to the
Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford administrations, the implications from
the study are suggestive of a larger pattern. Moe’s study also referenced the FTC and SEC,
two independent agencies with statutory bipartisan requirements; Moe found that the President had an impact on the performance of those agencies as well. Id. at 214, 217. This
does not suggest that partisan balance requirements are harmless, however. For example,
the presidential impact on the agencies did not align with the political ideology normally
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obtain favorable rulings from cross-party appointees on the NLRB.384 Again,
agency independence should not imply a complete, or almost complete,
imperviousness to presidential oversight—and this certainly seems to be a
central tenet of Free Enterprise Fund.385
To be sure, some scholars lament the NLRB’s predictable swings in policy (pro-labor versus pro-management) depending upon the occupant of the
White House.386 However, the NLRB’s regulatory efforts, whether pro-union
or pro-labor in tilt, have been, for the most part, reliably upheld by the federal courts at rates equal to or better than the regulatory efforts of other
federal agencies involved with regulating labor and employment issues.387
Thus, it is possible to achieve a significant level of agency independence
without requiring the President to appoint his political opponents to principal offices within the executive branch. Fixed terms of office, coupled with
good cause removal provisions, provide significant protection against direct
forms of political control by the President without denying the President the
ability to work with persons who hope to see the administration succeed at
the task of governing.
We recognize that it would be an overstatement to posit that statutory
partisan balance requirements entirely prevent Presidents from implementing their desired policy goals through independent agencies.388 Nevertheless, these statutory limitations plainly reduce a President’s ability to supervise
independent agencies on a day-to-day basis. This is not to suggest that Presidents should have the same level of control over independent agencies as
they do with executive departments. However, a President should have some
means of ensuring that independent agencies are sympathetic to the administration’s policy objectives and reasonably accountable to the President.
As things presently stand, presidential control is unduly hampered by
these statutory provisions and legislative influence is correspondingly
increased.389 This result is constitutionally problematic—particularly in light
associated with Democratic and Republican administrations. Id. Rather, Moe was forced
to come up with an alternative reasoning for the finding. Id. at 217–19.
384 Turner, supra note 357, at 730.
385 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 499–502
(rejecting the concept of a government “ruled by functionaries” as incompatible with the
separation of powers and holding that the President may not be reduced to the role of a
mere “cajoler-in-chief”).
386 Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud, The NLRB in Administrative Law Exile:
Problems with Its Structure and Function and Suggestions for Reform, 58 DUKE L.J. 2013, 2015–16
(2009).
387 Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Defending the NLRB: Improving the Agency’s Success in the Federal
Courts of Appeals, 5 FIU L. REV. 437, 438 (2010) (“[The NLRB’s] win rate is roughly in
line—albeit a bit lower—with other labor and employment agencies that engage in significant levels of adjudication.”). Although Professor Hirsch questions the NLRB’s effectiveness with difficult cases, he concedes that this could be the result, at least in part, of judicial
bias. Id. at 439.
388 See Wood, supra note 294, at 508–09.
389 See LEWIS, supra note 280, at 164–67; Lewis, supra note 366, at 379–80.
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of the requirements for presidential control and oversight set forth in Free
Enterprise Fund.390 A more constitutionally appropriate structure would permit Congress only to insulate agency heads from removal from office and by
providing for fixed terms of office—but not for mandatory partisan balance
requirements.391
IV.

PARTISAN BALANCE REQUIREMENTS

AND THE

SEPARATION

OF

POWERS

We come then to the crux of the matter: may Congress require the President to appoint political opponents to principal (or inferior) offices within
the executive branch consistent with the core holding of Free Enterprise Fund?
The answer, we believe, might well depend on whether such a condition is
conjoined with other limitations on the President’s ability to hold such
officers accountable.
If Congress requires the President to appoint political opponents to an
independent federal agency, but does not also entrench such persons with a
fixed term of office or good cause protection against removal, it is difficult to
see how a partisan balance requirement on these facts would significantly
impede the President’s ability to oversee and direct the agency’s operations.
If an appointee, of whatever partisan background, proves faithless and the
President may lawfully remove her from office at will, sufficient accountability plainly exists to satisfy the separation of powers doctrine.392
Moreover, Congress commonly has imposed substantive requirements,
by statute, for certain presidential appointments. For example, the U.S.
Code provides that the Solicitor General of the United States must be
“learned in the law.”393 If Congress, incident to its powers to create and
define the membership and authority of federal agencies, may impose substantive requirements on such presidential appointees, it is difficult to see
why Congress cannot mandate bipartisanship as well.394 The fact that Congress has consistently imposed such requirements and that the President has
accepted such statutory directives since the 1880s also should go a very long
way toward establishing the constitutional acceptability of the practice.395
At the same time, however, whatever substantive requirements Congress
imposes for a particular executive branch office, the question of accountability remains salient; good cause removal protection has the effect of rendering
the office holder (possessed of whatever characteristics Congress requires)
less accountable to the President. A fixed term of office also reduces the
390 See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 496–500, 513–14.
391 See supra notes 2, 297, 314 and accompanying text.
392 See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 496–500.
393 28 U.S.C. § 505 (2012) (“The President shall appoint in the Department of Justice,
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, a Solicitor General, learned in the law, to
assist the Attorney General in the performance of his duties.”).
394 But cf. supra notes 235–41 and accompanying text (arguing that objective professional qualifications can be distinguished from partisan balance requirements for purposes
of separation of powers analysis).
395 See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 5, at 414–18, 478–80.
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accountability of the office holder, although obviously to a lesser extent than
protection against removal from office absent good cause.
On the other hand, the need to remove members of independent federal agencies presumably would arise less frequently if the President enjoyed
a reasonably free hand in appointing members to independent boards, agencies, and commissions. Thus, a mandatory partisan balance requirement has
the effect of exacerbating the ill-effects of a good cause removal limitation by
providing the President with at most a bare working majority of an independent agency’s head from the start of her administration. It empowers a
group of would-be bomb-throwers who also happen to serve as principal
officers within these executive branch entities. What’s more, and as noted
earlier,396 a single bad pick from the President’s own party can empower a
rogue independent agency to operate largely free and clear of the President’s policies and direction—and potentially to do so for many months.
Because a partisan balance requirement makes agency cooperation with
the administration less likely than would be the case with a cabinet department staffed by a person or persons who are known supporters of the President and her agenda, this practice plainly has greater separation of powers
implications than a requirement that an appointee hold a particular professional credential or possess a certain amount of prior relevant experience. A
partisan balance requirement creates a political dynamic that makes it harder
for the President to hold the entity accountable—and, in turn, to be held
accountable for the agency’s actions.397 In this sense, then, a partisan balance requirement has separation of powers implications that other kinds of
statutory qualifications for holding an executive office simply do not.
The conjunction of a partisan balance requirement with good cause
removal protection greatly exacerbates the potential accountability problem
created by the imposition of a partisan balance requirement standing alone.
By limiting the President to a bare majority of political supporters at the
agency head level, and then prohibiting her from removing appointees who
prove unwilling to advance the administration’s policy agenda, the President
is effectively precluded from exercising effective control and oversight with
respect to the agency. In the terms of Free Enterprise Fund, without the power
to appoint persons in whom she reposes confidence and the concomitant
power to remove them from office if they prove to be poor stewards, “the
President could not be held fully accountable for discharging [her] own
responsibilities; the buck would stop somewhere else.”398
396 See supra subsection III.B.4.
397 Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 495–98 (emphasizing that administrative entities must
be “accountable” to the President and noting that “[t]he diffusion of power carries with it a
diffusion of accountability”); see id. at 501–02 (“The President has been given the power to
oversee executive officers; he is not limited, as in Harry Truman’s lament, to ‘persuad[ing]’ his unelected subordinates ‘to do what they ought to do without persuasion.’”
(alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
398 Id. at 514.
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One obvious solution—and a solution presaged by Professors Huq399
and Stack400—would be to hold unconstitutional good cause removal protections. This would, of course, require overturning Humphrey’s Executor.401
Some jurists, including Judge Brett Kavanaugh, already have advocated taking precisely this step.402
Were the Supreme Court to invalidate good cause removal protections
or, alternatively, to hold that Article II requires that the President enjoy a
free hand to define what constitutes “good cause” grounds for removal,403
the separation of powers objection to mandatory partisan balance requirements would largely dissipate. The President’s ability to remove at will a principal officer serving on an independent agency, board, or commission would
ensure sufficient accountability—even under the demanding formalist metrics of Free Enterprise Fund. Moreover, such a plenary removal power would
undoubtedly have a significant constraining effect on opposition party members serving as members of collective agency heads; they would no longer be
free to “ride with the cops and cheer for the robbers.”404
With that said, however, the Supreme Court should pause before
embracing such a revolutionary outcome. As Professor Strauss warns, “[o]ne
would have to look long and hard to find developed systems anywhere in the
world that deliver financial institutions into politicians’ direct control.”405
This is so because “[c]ontrol of the markets and of the money supply is not
safe in their hands.”406 Accordingly, one should question whether a pragmatic formalist would be willing to open Pandora’s box. We certainly do not
advocate overturning Humphrey’s Executor and requiring, as a matter of constitutional law that all executive officers serve at the pleasure of the President.
Congress has insulated executive officers from direct forms of presidential
399 Huq, supra note 19, at 3–5.
400 Stack, supra note 12, at 2414–15, 2419.
401 Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 620, 627–29 (1935).
402 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 685–87,
701–04 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting), rev’d in part, 561 U.S. 477. Justice
Scalia also has questioned the constitutional validity of insulating principal executive
officers from removal from office except for “good cause.” Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S.
654, 706–07 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (expressing incredulity that the good cause
removal limitation on the President’s power to remove an independent counsel—a provision he pejoratively characterizes as “shackles”—actually constitutes a means of empowering the President to oversee the work of an independent counsel); cf. id. at 691–93
(majority opinion) (holding that the “good cause” removal power held by the Attorney
General constituted a sufficient means of securing constitutionally adequate presidential
oversight and, accordingly, satisfied the separation of powers doctrine).
403 See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 9, at 581–85, 595, 639–42, 660; Calabresi &
Rhodes, supra note 9, at 1165–67; Prakash, supra note 9, at 992; see also Miller, supra note 9,
at 44 (arguing that the President must have plenary control over all persons within the
executive branch who exercise policymaking authority).
404 Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 394 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
405 Strauss, supra note 11, at 2283.
406 Id.
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(political) control since the Washington Administration and too much water
has flowed under the bridge to revisit this important baseline question.407
In our view, a more limited approach would provide a better potential
solution: if Congress wishes to require bipartisan appointments, at least for
principal officers serving within the executive branch,408 it should grant the
President a relatively free hand in removing such officers. Congress should
have the choice of mandating partisan balance requirements or insulating
principal officers who serve on agency heads from removal; it should not be
permitted to impose both conditions concurrently (at least under the logic of
Free Enterprise Fund).
One related point merits at least brief mention: may Congress conjoin
fixed terms of office with partisan balance requirements? Initial consideration of this question yields an easy, reflexive “yes”—after all, if the President
may terminate an appointment before a fixed term of years expires, in what
way is the Free Enterprise Fund accountability principle compromised by marrying up a partisan balance requirement with a fixed term of office? More
careful reflection, however, makes the validity of this initial response substantially less certain.
Free Enterprise Fund found that SEC commissioners enjoy good cause protection from removal, despite the absence of a formal statutory requirement
expressly conferring such protection from removal before the expiration of
an appointee’s term of office.409 Justice Breyer strongly objected to this
aspect of the majority’s decision,410 positing that Congress intentionally omitted good cause removal protection in light of Myers.411 To be sure, as Justice
Breyer argues, “[t]he absence of a ‘for cause’ [removal] provision is . . . not
407 See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Resignations, the (Quasi) Plural Executive, and a Critical
Assessment of the Unitary Executive Theory, in SPEECH AND SILENCE IN AMERICAN LAW 89–93
(Austin Sarat ed., 2010) (arguing that the Constitution’s text and consistent historical practice both support a constitutional requirement for meaningful presidential oversight of
federal agencies but also positing that this oversight power is not necessarily the power to
directly control or compel agency action); see also Strauss, supra note 13, at 599–601,
640–42 (arguing from textual and functional grounds that the President must have the
ability to supervise, but not necessarily directly to control, the work of federal agencies).
408 General agreement now exists that even though independent federal agencies
engage in quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial activities, these entities fall squarely within the
executive branch; accordingly, presidential oversight and accountability are requisite. See
Strauss, supra note 11, at 2283 (“Looking at the propositions on which all nine Justices
agree, one can see the independent regulatory commissions now clearly placed where they
should be—not a ‘headless fourth branch,’ but elements of the executive branch in a different—but necessary—oversight relationship with the President.”). But cf. Humphrey’s
Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 220–27 (1935) (characterizing service on the FTC as
involving essentially legislative and judicial work, rather than service within the executive
branch).
409 See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 486–87
(2010).
410 See id. at 545–48 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
411 Id. at 546 (“Nor is the absence of a ‘for cause’ provision in the statute that created
the Commission likely to have been inadvertent.”).
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fatal to agency independence.”412 Given the majority’s holding on this
point, presumably other indicia of independence, including fixed terms of
office, can give rise to an implied “good cause” removal limitation. If this is
so, then the problem with a mandatory partisan balance requirement would
arise in any and all cases where an implied, as opposed to express, limitation
on the President’s removal power exists.
The easy, and obvious, solution to this potential problem would be for
federal courts simply to refrain from inferring good cause removal limitations for independent agencies that have organic statutes requiring
mandatory bipartisanship for those persons comprising the agency’s head. A
well-established canon of constitutional adjudication holds that whenever it is
possible to interpret a statute to avoid a constitutional problem, that interpretation, if plausible, should be embraced.413 If applied on these facts, the
canon would strongly suggest that federal courts should not imply for-cause
removal protection with respect to entities that feature mandatory partisan
balance requirements.
This approach also would clearly advance the value of accountability that
Free Enterprise Fund places such importance upon. Interpreting removal
restrictions narrowly, rather than broadly, would facilitate the kind of presidential oversight that Chief Justice Roberts and the Free Enterprise Fund majority thought essential to the unitary executive.414
Although the limitations of time and space (and the patience of readers)
prevent us from developing the argument at length, we note in passing that
very plausible functionalist arguments exist against permitting partisan balance requirements to be combined with good cause removal limitations. Partisan balance requirements had their genesis in the modernist period, a time
of great faith in the ability of agency expertise—and science—to produce
good government policy.415 Unbridled faith in agency expertise proved misguided and today most reasonable observers embrace, at least to some
extent, a public choice understanding of agency functioning.416
Agencies certainly possess expertise, but they also constitute a significant
field of battle for interest group politics. To the extent that partisan balance
412 Id. at 547.
413 See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,
485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937); see
also Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1945, 1948–49 (1997) (discussing the canon that calls for avoiding statutory interpretations that raise constitutional
problems and the Supreme Court’s application of this rule over time).
414 Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 496–502, 510–13.
415 See Michael F. Duggan, The Municipal Ideal and the Unknown End: A Resolution of
Oliver Wendell Holmes, 83 N.D. L. REV. 463, 470 n.28 (2007) (noting that storied Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes “lived long enough to straddle the naturalist and modernist traditions” and that “Holmes was also a great believer in the theories of population expressed by
Thomas Robert Malthus”). See generally A CENTURY OF EUGENICS IN AMERICA (Paul A.
Lombardo ed., 2011); A CONCISE COMPANION TO MODERNISM (David Bradshaw ed., 2003);
POPULAR EUGENICS (Susan Currell & Christina Cogdell eds., 2006).
416 See generally JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE (1997).
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requirements impede agency functioning and render elections less meaningful,417 sound functionalist objections exist to their use. Indeed, given the
potential dysfunction associated with the creation of independent agencies
with a built-in heckler’s gallery located within the agency head,418 a committed functionalist should harbor serious misgivings about the use of
mandatory partisan balance requirements. Again, given the limitations of
space and time, we leave for another day fuller development of this thesis.
Finally, one might object that the practical difference between a statutory mandate requiring bipartisan appointments and the de facto practice of
the Senate in confirming, or refusing to confirm, presidential nominees,
might not be very great. Two responses to this potential objection exist.
First, formalism, unlike functionalism, seeks to erect prophylactic rules
that prevent potential problems before they arise—in this instance, an unaccountable federal bureaucracy that operates, to use Professor Strauss’s wonderful turn of phrase, as a “headless fourth branch”419 of the federal
government. Whether these rules actually affect outcomes on the ground is
at best a secondary consideration. Formalism also places great emphasis on
means, as opposed to ends; if the same result obtains by virtue of a branch
exercising a power the Framers vested with it, so be it.
Second, a statutory mandate clearly operates differently than a naked
political demand; were partisan-balance requirements to go the way of the
legislative veto,420 a contemporary Senate majority would have to take political responsibility—and potentially be held electorally accountable—for refusing to confirm presidential appointees to independent agencies because such
nominees all happen to be political fellow-travelers of the President. A statutory mandate, in theory, renders the President’s failure to make bipartisan
nominations legally invalid—and a reviewing court might so hold. But, even
if the opposition party in the Senate could successfully demand appointees to
independent agencies, boards, and commissions, from a formalist perspective, an effective political demand is simply not the same thing as a binding
legal requirement set forth in the U.S. Code.
CONCLUSION
We do not yet know whether, as a constitutional precedent, Free Enterprise
Fund will prove to be a mountain or a molehill. If the decision proves to be
durable, and establishes a renormalized understanding of Article II’s mini417 Cf. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 59
(1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“A change in administration brought about by the people casting their votes is a perfectly reasonable basis for an
executive agency’s reappraisal of the costs and benefits of its programs and regulations. As
long as the agency remains within the bounds established by Congress, it is entitled to
assess administrative records and evaluate priorities in light of the philosophy of the
administration.” (footnote omitted)).
418 See supra text and accompanying notes 325–51, 404–08.
419 Strauss, supra note 11, at 2283 (internal quotation marks omitted).
420 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944, 954–58 (1983).
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mum level of presidential oversight authority over independent federal agencies with significant policymaking authority, the constitutional status of
partisan balance requirements, when combined with good cause removal limitations, appears highly questionable. In fact, well regarded administrative
law scholars have suggested that Free Enterprise Fund might well sound the
death knell for even single-layer good cause removal restrictions;421 if this is
so, then the decision certainly portends significant constitutional problems
for mandatory partisan balance requirements that force the President to
appoint her political opponents to principal offices within the executive
branch and then significantly constrain her ability to remove these appointees through good cause removal limitations.
In sum, if the Supreme Court actually meant what it appeared to say
about the centrality of presidential oversight to the separation of powers doctrine—and to the accountability of the President for the actions of independent agencies—then the use of mandatory partisan balance requirements
should be held to violate the separation of powers doctrine (at least when
combined with significant statutory protections against removal from office).
Requiring the President to pursue her policies through the good offices of
political opponents, holding principal offices within the executive branch,
simply cannot be squared with the vision of the unitary executive set forth in
Free Enterprise Fund. Accordingly, we believe that the use of mandatory partisan balance requirements, in conjunction with good cause protection against
removal from office, likely violates the separation of powers in this age of new
formalism.

421

See supra notes 399–400 and accompanying text.
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PARTISAN BALANCE REQUIREMENTS APPENDIX
The Tables below depict the history of Congress’s employment of the
partisan balance requirement in federal agencies and commissions.
Table 1: Independent Agencies with Partisan Balance Requirements422
Body

Organic Act

Date
Created

Split

Removal
Protection

Utah
Commission

Act of Mar. 22, 1882, ch. 47,
22 Stat. 30

1882

3/5

Statute silent

Civil Service
Commission423

Act of Jan. 16, 1883, ch. 27,
22 Stat. 403

1883

2/3

At will (“the
President may
remove any
commissioner”)

Interstate
Commerce
Commission

Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104,
§ 11, 24 Stat. 379, 383

1887

3/5

For cause
(“inefficiency,
neglect of duty,
or
malfeasance”)

Board of
General
Appraisers424

Act of June 10, 1890, ch.
407, § 12, 26 Stat. 131, 136

1890

5/9

For cause
(“inefficiency,
neglect of duty,
or
malfeasance”)

“[V]arious
commissions to
negotiate Indian
Treaties”425

Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 412,
§ 14, 25 Stat. 980, 1005
(Cherokee)

1889
1890
1892
1896

2/3
(all)

Statutes silent

Act of Aug. 19, 1890, ch.
807, 26 Stat. 336, 354
(Chippewa)
Act of July 13, 1892, ch. 164,
27 Stat. 120, 138–39
422 In order of date of creation. For a similar, but shorter, listing of collegial bodies
with various statutory qualification requirements, see HOGUE, supra note 172, at 25 tbl.A-2.
423 Reorganized as the United States Office of Personnel Management in 1979. The
Office of Personnel Management does not have a mandated partisan balance requirement.
5 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1103 (2012).
424 The Board was at issue in Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311 (1903), where the
Court held that the President had the power to remove appraisers “on other grounds than
those mentioned in the act.” Id. at 319. Briefly mentioning the qualifications of the office,
including the requirement that “[n]ot more than five of such general appraisers shall be
appointed from the same political party,” the Court said, in dicta, “[t]here is, of course, no
doubt of the power of Congress to create such an office as is provided for in the above
section.” Id. at 313.
425 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 270, 270 n.51 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(listing various bodies with “restrictions on the power of nomination by require[ed]
political representation”).
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(Shoshone/Arapaho)
Act of June 10, 1896, ch.
398, 29 Stat. 321, 342
(Klamath)
Federal Trade
Commission426

15 U.S.C. § 41 (Act of Sept.
26, 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-203,
38 Stat. 717)

1914

3/5

For cause
(“inefficiency,
neglect of duty,
or
malfeasance”)

U.S. Shipping
Board

Act of Sept. 7, 1916, Pub. L.
No. 64-260, § 3, 39 Stat. 728,
729

1916

3/5

For cause
(“inefficiency,
neglect of duty,
or
malfeasance”)

U.S. Employees’
Compensation
Commission427

Act of Sept. 7, 1916, Pub. L.
No. 64-267, § 28, 39 Stat.
742, 748

1916

2/3

Statute silent

U.S.
International
Trade
Commission428

19 U.S.C. § 1330 (Revenue
Act of 1916, Pub L. No. 64271, 39 Stat. 756, 795)

1916

3/6

Statute silent

Federal Energy
Regulatory
Commission429

42 U.S.C. § 7171

1920
(1977)430

3/5

For cause
(“inefficiency,
neglect of duty,
or malfeasance
in office”)
§ 7171(b)(1)

Board of
General
Appraisers

Tariff Act of 1922, Pub L.
No. 67-318, § 518, 42 Stat.
858, 972–73

1922

5/9

For cause
(“Neglect of
duty,
malfeasance in
office, or
inefficiency”)

426 William E. Humphrey, of Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935),
was a member of the FTC; his estate challenged his removal from that body by FDR. In its
brief to the Supreme Court, the U.S. government essentially conceded the propriety of the
partisan balance requirement by arguing that other “safeguards designed to achieve . . .
independence,” such as the FTC’s mandated partisan split, obviated the need for “an
implied limitation of the removal power such as that contended for by [Humphrey’s
Executor].” Brief for the United States at 18–19, Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. 602 (No. 667),
1935 WL 32965, at *18–19.
427 Reorganized to be housed within the Department of Labor in 1945.
428 Formerly the “U.S. Tariff Commission.” Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 700, 39
Stat. 756, 795 (establishing the Tariff Commission which was changed in 1975).
429 Formerly the “Federal Power Commission.” Act of June 10, 1920, ch. 285, § 1, 41
Stat. 1063.
430 Reorganized in 1977. 42 U.S.C. § 7171 (2012).
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1923

4/
8431

Statute silent

1927
(1934)433

3/
5434

Statute silent

1932

3/5

Statute silent

1934
(1978)435

2/3

Statute silent

Home Loan
Bank Board

Federal Home Loan Bank
Act, Pub. L. No. 72-304, § 17,
47 Stat. 725, 736

National Credit
Union
Administration
Board

12 U.S.C. § 1752a(b)(1)

National
Mediation
Board

45 U.S.C. § 154 (Act of June
21, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-442,
§ 4, 48 Stat. 1185, 1193)

1934

2/3

For cause
(“inefficiency,
neglect of duty,
malfeasance in
office, or
ineligibility”)
§ 154

Securities
Exchange
Commission

15 U.S.C. § 78d (Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, Pub.
L. No. 73-291, §§ 4, 48 Stat.
881, 885)

1934

3/5

Statute silent436

Social Security
Board437

Act of Aug. 14, 1935, Pub. L.
No. 74-271, tit.VII, § 701, 49

1935

2/3

Statute silent

431 The Secretary of the Treasury was an ex officio member. Act of Feb. 28, 1923, ch.
146, 42 Stat. 1325, 1326.
432 Formerly the “Federal Radio Commission.” The Radio Commission was established
in 1926. See infra note 433; see also LUCAS A. POWE, JR., AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT 72–81 (1987); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Inevitable Wasteland: Why
the Public Trustee Model of Broadcast Television Regulation Must Fail, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2101,
2105 (1997) (book review).
433 The powers of the Federal Radio Commission, Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69632, 44 Stat. 1162, were transferred to the FCC by the Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 652,
§ 603(b), 48 Stat. 1102.
434 The Federal Radio Commission had five members, limited to three being of the
same political party. When Congress created the FCC, it increased the number of
commissions to seven with a limit of four members of the same political party.
Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 4(a)–(b), 48 Stat. 1064, 1066.
Congress decreased this number in 1982 to a five-member commission with a three-to-five
split. Act of Sept. 8, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-253, § 501, 96 Stat. 805.
435 Reorganized as an independent executive agency in 1978. Act of Nov. 10, 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 501, 92 Stat. 3680.
436 For the debate on the meaning of this statutory silence regarding removal, see Huq,
supra note 19.
437 Eventually replaced by the Social Security Administration, which lacks a partisan
balance requirement. Act of Aug. 15, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-296, Title I, § 101, 108 Stat.
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Stat. 620, 635; Aug. 28, 1950,
ch. 809, tit. IV, § 401(a), 64
Stat. 558
United States
Maritime
Commission

Merchant Marine Act of
1936, Pub. L. No. 74-835,
§ 201(a), 49 Stat. 1985

1936

3/5

For cause
(“neglect of
duty or
malfeasance in
office”)

Civil
Aeronautics
Board438

Civil Aeronautics Act of
1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706,
§ 201(a), 52 Stat. 973,
980–81

1938
(1940)

3/5

For cause
(“inefficiency,
neglect of duty,
malfeasance”)

Export-Import
Bank of the
United States

12 U.S.C. § 635a (ExportImport Bank Act of 1945,
Pub. L. No. 79-173, § 3, 59
Stat. 526, 527)

1945
(1934)439

3/5

At will (“at the
pleasure of the
President”)
§ 635a(c)(8)(i)

Nuclear
Regulatory
Commission440

42 U.S.C. § 5841 (organic
act: Atomic Energy Act of
1946, Pub. L. No. 79-585, 60
Stat. 755; reorganized by the
Energy Reorganization Act of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-438,
88 Stat. 1233)

1946
(1977)

3/5

For cause
(“inefficiency,
neglect of duty,
or
malfeasance”)
§ 5841(e)

Federal
Maritime
Commission

46 U.S.C. § 301

1961

3/5

For cause
(“inefficiency,
neglect of duty,
or
malfeasance”)
§ 301(b)(3)

1465. For a history of the myriad changes made to the administration of the Social
Security program, see Social Security History, SOC. SEC., http://ssa.gov/history/orghist.html
(last visited Jan. 5, 2015).
438 Founded as the Civil Aeronautics Authority in 1938. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938,
Pub. L. No. 75-706, § 201(a), 52 Stat. 973, 980. This agency was a forerunner to the
modern Federal Aviation Agency, Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726,
§ 301(a), 72 Stat. 731, 744, now the Federal Aviation Administration, housed in the
Department of Transportation and lacking a partisan balance requirement. 49 U.S.C.
§ 106 (2012).
439 In 1934, FDR first chartered the Export-Import Bank by executive order, calling it “a
banking corporation.” Exec. Order No. 6581, 12 C.F.R. § 401 (Feb. 2, 1934), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14772. The President named the first five
members of the board of trustees and did not impose any express partisan balance
requirement. In 1945, Congress reestablished the Bank as “an independent agency of the
United States” and mandated that its Board of Directors be made up of no “more than
three . . . members of any one political party.” 12 U.S.C. § 635a(a), (c)(2).
440 Formerly the “Atomic Energy Commission,” which was created in 1946.
Reorganization occurred in 1977. Both agencies had mandated three-of-five partisan
majority requirements.
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Peace Corps
National
Advisory Council

22 U.S.C. § 2511

1961

8/15

At will (“at the
pleasure of the
President”)
§ 2511(c)(2)(G)

Equal
Employment
Opportunity
Commission

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (Civil
Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L.
No. 88-352, tit. VII, § 705, 78
Stat. 241, 258)

1964

3/5

Statute silent

National
Transportation
Safety Board

49 U.S.C. § 1111

1967
(1974)441

3/5

For cause
(“inefficiency,
neglect of duty,
or
malfeasance”)
§ 1111(c)

Inter-American
Foundation

22 U.S.C. § 290f (Foreign
Assistance Act of 1969, Pub.
L. No. 91-175, § 401, 83 Stat.
805, 821)

1969

5/9

Statute silent

Postal
Regulatory
Commission442

39 U.S.C. § 501 (Postal
Reorganization Act, Pub. L.
No. 91-375, 84 Stat. 719, 759
(1970), amended by Postal
Accountability and
Enhancement Act, Pub. L.
No. 109-435, 120 Stat. 3198,
3238 (2006))

1970

3/5

For cause (“for
cause”)
§ 502(a)

Farm Credit
Administration
Board

12 U.S.C. § 2242 (Farm
Credit Act of 1971, Pub. L.
No. 92-181, § 5.8, 85 Stat.
583, 617)

1971

2/3

Statute silent

Consumer
Product Safety
Commission

15 U.S.C. § 2053 (Consumer
Product Safety Act, Pub. L.
No. 92-573, § 4, 86 Stat.
1207, 1210 (1972))

1972

3/5

For cause
(“neglect of
duty or
malfeasance in
office”)
§ 2053(a)

Federal Election
Commission

2 U.S.C. § 437c

1974443

3/6

Statute silent

441 In 1974, Congress reestablished the NTSB as an independent agency outside the
Department of Transportation. Transportation Safety Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-633,
§ 303(a), (b)(2), (c), 88 Stat. 2156, 2167–68.
442 Originally named the “Postal Rate Commission.” Postal Reorganization Act, Pub. L.
No. 91-375, § 3601, 84 Stat. 719, 759 (1970). It was renamed in 2006. 39 U.S.C. § 501;
Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act, Pub. L. No. 109-435, 120 Stat. 3198, 3238
(2006).
443 Congress created the FEC in 1974; however, because of the unconstitutionality of
the organic act’s appointments scheme, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the FEC
was not an operating body until 1976. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 208(a), 88 Stat. 1263, 1280 (renumbered § 309), amended by
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Commodity
Future Trading
Commission

7 U.S.C. § 2 (Commodity
Futures Trading Comission
Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93463, §§ 101(a)(1)-(3), 201,
202, 88 Stat. 1389, 1395)

1975

3/5

Statute silent

Federal Labor
Relations
Authority

5 U.S.C. § 7104 (Civil Service
Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-454, § 701, 92 Stat.
1111, 1196)

1978
(1883)444

2/3

For cause
(“inefficiency,
neglect of duty,
or
malfeasance”)
§ 7104(b)

U.S. Merit
System
Protections
Board

5 U.S.C. § 1201 (Civil Service
Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-454, § 202(a), 92 Stat.
1111, 1121)

1978
(1883)445

2/3

For cause
(“inefficiency,
neglect of duty,
or
malfeasance”)
§ 1202(d)

African
Development
Foundation

22 U.S.C. § 290h-5
(International Security and
Development Cooperation
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96533, § 507, 94 Stat. 3131,
3154)

1980

4/7

Statute silent

Advisory Board
for Cuba
Broadcasting

22 U.S.C. § 1465c (Radio
Broadcasting to Cuba Act,
Pub. L. No. 98-111, § 5, 97
Stat. 749, 750–51 (1983))

1983

5/9

Statute silent

Defense of
Nuclear
Facilities Safety
Board

42 U.S.C. § 2286 (National
Defense Authorization Act,
Fiscal Year 1989, Pub. L. No.
100-456, § 311, 102 Stat.
2076 (1988))

1988

3/5

Statute silent

Morris K. Udall
and Stewart L.

20 U.S.C. § 5603

1992

3/
5446

Statute silent

Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, §§ 101(a)–(d),
105, 90 Stat. 475, 476, 481.
444 The Authority was created out of the reorganization of the former Civil Service
Commission (1883), which also created the Office of Personnel Management and the
Merit System Protections Board. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92
Stat. 1111; see also About MSPB, U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., http://www.mspb.gov/about/
about.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2015).
445 The Board was created out of the reorganization of the former Civil Service
Commission (1883), which also created the Office of Personnel Management and the
Federal Labor Relations Authority. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-454, 92
Stat 1111; see also About MSPB, supra note 444.
446 The Board is made up of a total of thirteen trustees, four of which sit ex officio and
without voting capacity. 20 U.S.C. § 5603. The President appoints the remaining nine
trustees: two of which are appointed on the recommendation of the Speaker of the House
and in consultation with the Minority Leader of the House; two of which are appointed on
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Udall
Foundation
Board of
Trustees
Broadcasting
Board of
Governors

22 U.S.C. § 6203

1994

4/
8447

Statute silent

Surface
Transportation
Board

49 U.S.C. § 701 (ICC
Termination Act of 1995,
Pub. L. No. 104-88, § 201(a),
109 Stat. 803, 932)

1996

2/3

For cause
(“inefficiency,
neglect of duty,
or
malfeasance”)
§ 701(b)(3)

Election
Assistance
Commission

42 U.S.C. § 15323 (Help
America Vote Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-252, § 203,
116 Stat. 1666, 1674)

2002

2/4

Statute silent

Privacy and Civil
Liberties
Oversight Board

42 U.S.C. § 2000ee
(Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458,
§ 1061, 118 Stat. 3638, 3684)

2004

3/5

Statute silent

the recommendation of the President pro tempore of the Senate and in consultation with
the Minority Leader of the Senate; and five of which are appointed by the President alone,
“not more than three of whom shall be of the same political party.” Id.
447 This figure excludes the Secretary of State, who sits as a nonvoting member ex
officio. 22 U.S.C. § 6203(b)(3).
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Table 2: Cabinet Level Bodies with Partisan Balance Requirements448
Removal
Protection

Body

Organic Act

Date

Split

Dep’t

Federal
Farm Loan
Board

Federal Farm Loan
Act, Pub. L. No.
64-158, § 3, 39 Stat.
360 (1916)

1916

3/5449

Dep’t of
Treasury450

Statute silent

U.S.
22 U.S.C. § 1469
Advisory
(United States
Commission Information and
on Public
Educational
Diplomacy
Exchange Act of
1948, Pub. L. No.
80-402, § 601, 60
Stat. 6, 10–11,
amended by
Department of
State Authorization
Act, Fiscal Years
1980 and 1981,
Pub. L. No. 96-60,
§ 203(f), 93 Stat.
395, 399)

1948

4/7

Dep’t of
State451

Statute silent

National
25 U.S.C. § 2704
Indian
(Indian Gaming
Gaming
Regulatory Act,
Commission Pub. L. No. 100497, § 5, 102 Stat.
2467, 2469 (1988))

1988

2/3452

Dep’t of
Interior453

For cause (“neglect
of duty, or
malfeasance in
office, or for other
good cause
shown”)
§ 2704(b)(6)

448 This is not intended to be an exhaustive list, but is rather intended to present some
of the most obvious examples.
449 The Secretary of Treasury was an ex officio member. Federal Farm Loan Act, Pub.
L. No. 64-158, § 3, 39 Stat. 360 (1916).
450 The Board’s organic act establishes the Board “at the seat of government in the
Department of the Treasury.” Id.
451 The Commission maintains its website through the State Department and states that
it reports “to the President, Secretary of State, and Congress.” U.S. Advisory Commission on
Public Diplomacy: About the Commission, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/
pdcommission/about/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2015).
452 The President of the United States is given the authority to appoint the chairman of
the Commission; the Secretary of the Interior appoints the remaining two associate
members, who must be of differing political parties. 25 U.S.C. § 2704(B)(a)–(b).
453 The Commission’s organic act states that the Commission is “established within the
Department of the Interior.” Id. § 2704(a).
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Table 3: “Article I Courts” with Partisan Balance Requirements
Organic
Act

Date
Created

Court of Appeals for
Veteran Claims454

38 U.S.C.
§ 7251

1988

5/9455

For cause (“misconduct,
neglect of duty, engaging
in the practice of law, or
violating [38 U.S.C.
§ 7255(c)]”)

Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces456

10 U.S.C.
§ 941

1951

3/5

For cause (“neglect of
duty; misconduct; or
mental or physical
disability”) § 942(c)

Body

Partisan
Split

Removal Protection

Table 4: Article III Bodies with Partisan Balance Requirements
Body

Organic Act

U.S. Court of
International
Trade457

28 U.S.C. § 251 (Act
of June 25, 1948, Pub.
L. No. 80-773, § 251,
62 Stat. 869, 899)

U.S. Sentencing
Commission458

28 U.S.C. § 991

Date
Created

Partisan
Split

1948
(1980)

5/9

For cause (“good
behavior”) § 252

1984

4/7

For cause (“neglect of
duty or malfeasance
in office or for other
good cause shown”)
§ 991(a)

Removal Protection

454 Congress expressed that the Court was established “under Article I of the
Constitution.” 38 U.S.C. § 7251.
455 The number of seats on the court is not established by statute; however, the statute
mandates that the court shall not consist of “more than seven judges.” 38 U.S.C.
§ 7253(a). Interestingly, at the writing of this Article, the court was made up of nine active
judges. See Judges, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS, http://www.uscourts.cavc
.gov/judges.php (last visited Jan. 5, 2015).
456 Congress expressed that the Court was established under “article I of the
Constitution.” 10 U.S.C. § 941.
457 Formerly the U.S. Customs Court, it was renamed in 1980. Act of Oct. 10, 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-417, § 101, 94 Stat. 1727. Congress expressly “established [the Court of
International Trade] under article III of the constitution of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 251(a). For a persuasive argument that the Court of International Trade is
unconstitutionally composed, see Adam J. Rappaport, Comment, The Court of International
Trade’s Political Party Diversity Requirement: Unconstitutional Under Any Separation of Powers
Theory, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1429 (2001).
458 Congress expressly established the Sentencing Commission “as an independent
commission in the judicial branch.” 28 U.S.C. § 991(a).
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